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Introduction
Many differences about economic policy could be eliminated if we were able to correctly
predict the results of any given measure. This is the aim of economics as a positive science,
“to provide a system of generalization which can be used to make correct predictions
about the consequences of any change in circumstances” (Friedman 1953). Every effort
to contribute to positive economics is divided into two steps: to construct a hypothesis
which yields an observable prediction and to test its validity with empirical evidence. Both
steps have become easier in recent years: first, the advent of simulation in economic theory
has made it possible to deduce testable predictions from models which are too complex
to be solved analytically. Second, advances in our understanding of identification and
statistical theory have increased the credibility of empirical tests. The application of
these new quantitative methods is now an important part of modern economic reasoning.
The economic crisis that began in 2007 demonstrated that our knowledge in positive
economics is incomplete at best: economists predicted widely different consequences of the
financial crisis and the impact of proposed and implemented policies. For example, leading
economists claimed that a dollar spent by the government would result either in 1.6 dollar
(Romer and Bernstein 2009) or 0.4 to 0.8 dollar (Barro and Redlick 2011) of additional
gross domestic product. Such disagreements understandably confused policy makers and
the public, leading some commentators to declare the current study of economics broken
(Krugman 2009, Stiglitz 2011). At the same time, the apparent absence of knowledge
provided a strong incentive for research economists to put the new quantitative methods
to work to build new models and to test new predictions.1
1For example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) showed with simulations that introducing
a binding zero-lower bound on interest rates raises the government spending multiplier to 1.6-2.3 in a
DSGE model.
1
Introduction
With the help of quantitative economics, this dissertation analyzes three topics which
have become particularly relevant in the ongoing economic crisis. In the first chapter, we
model theoretically the influence of a credit crunch on investment behavior and market
structure. The second chapter is an empirical study concerned with the effects of the
business cycle on the allocation of talent within an economy. The last chapter turns to
new sources of economic growth by considering the effect of taxes on investment in new
companies by venture capital funds. Each chapter is outlined in turn. The chapters are
arranged in the order of their inception and can be read independently.
The first chapter of this dissertation examines the effect of a change in borrowing con-
straints on the equilibrium market structure in a dynamic duopoly model.2 Recessions
caused by banking crises are often accompanied by a credit crunch, the reduction of credit
available to companies in the real economy. According to standard macroeconomic mod-
els, a lesser amount of available credit leads to a reduction in investment, resulting in turn
in lower production. However, these models do not take into account that more severe
financial constraints might also lead to fewer firms competing in the product market, i.e.,
to a change in market structure. For the consumer, market structure is important because
it directly influences prices and the available choices.
This chapter contributes to the literature by proposing a computationally feasible model
integrating financial constraints in a duopoly framework. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first model to explicitly consider the effect of financial constraints on equilib-
rium market structure. More concretely, we introduce firms with an endogenous capital
structure and an optimizing bank into an Ericson-Pakes framework. To solve this model,
a novel learning algorithm is used, based on the Experience Based Markov Equilibrium
framework of Fershtman and Pakes (2011). This is necessary because the endogenous
capital structure of the firms gives rise to a dynamic optimization problem which cannot
be solved with conventional computational methods.
Using this model, we find that credit rationing can amplify the effects of small idiosyncratic
shocks to a firm, potentially even causing the firm to exit the market. If a firm loses
production capacity through a shock, less profit is available for financing investment.
2This chapter is based on the article “Credit Cycles in a Dynamic Duopoly”.
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With well-functioning credit markets, the firm can compensate for this reduction in cash
flow by taking out more debt. But if credit is rationed, firms might be unable to cover
the cost of adding capacity. Without investment, the firm remains at the lower capacity
level which is associated with less funds. If the firm is hit by another depreciation shock
which further tightens credit constraints, its ability to react by an increase in investment
is reduced even more. Eventually, this process can force the firm to exit the market, even
if it is equally productive as the remaining firm. The resulting reduction in the number
of competitors is (relatively) stable because new entrants cannot enter immediately and
replace the failing firm as they face credit constraints, too.
The second chapter analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the distribution of skills
across sectors.3 The ongoing recession led to a growing interest in academia on the effects
of downturns on labour market outcomes. In particular, recent studies have found a strong
and persistent negative impact of recessions on individuals employment and earnings. Yet,
as far as we know, there is no study which examines whether highly skilled individuals
react to recessions by changing occupations and the impact these reactions might have on
talent allocation across sectors. This chapter fills this gap in the literature by looking at a
specific market where skill can be easily measured: the market for academic economists.
We study the impact of recessions on skill allocation by relating the research productivity
and career choice of economists graduating from the leading universities to measures of the
business cycle during the last 50 years. To guide our empirics, we develop a model of the
self-selection of talent into business and academia, where entering academia is competitive
but attractive during recessions. This model predicts that fewer economists who faced a
recession at time of application to the PhD program stay in academia after graduation.
Those who do stay are positively selected on academic productivity. Moreover, if there
is a recession at the time of graduation, more economists pursue academic employment,
which leads to a higher publication output per PhD graduate.
The results of the empirical analysis support the theoretical predictions. In particular,
they show that individuals do react to recession shocks. Economists applying or graduat-
3This chapter is based on the article “The Allocation of Talent: Evidence from the Market of
Economists” which is joint work with Michael Böhm from the London School of Economics and Po-
litical Sciences.
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ing during recessions publish significantly more than economists applying or graduating in
a boom. A recession at entry leads to fewer PhD students pursuing an academic career, a
recession at graduation has the opposite effect. Moreover, the effects are of economically
substantial magnitude. Taking our estimates literally, we expect assistant professors from
the cohort of graduate students who applied for the PhD during the recession of 2008
(3.5 percentage points increase in unemployment) to be around 24 % more productive
than assistant professors from a cohort applying in an average year (0 % unemployment
change). We also expect PhD graduates from 2008 to produce on average 20 % more
publications in their early careers than economists graduating in an average year. Taken
together, it appears to be the case that recessions can lead to a positive selection of talent
into academia.
The third chapter turns to new sources of growth by considering the effect of tax changes
on the probability of a start-up company receiving investment from a venture capital
fund.4 Around the world, governments introduce policies to promote start-up companies
to spur new growth in their economies. These companies are often financed by private
venture-capital funds that provide advice and support along with risk capital. Venture
capital-backed companies are of special interest for the policy maker because they are
particularly innovative. For example, a dollar spent on venture capital yielded more than
twice as many patents than a dollar spent on R&D by established companies in the United
States in the period from 1983 to 1992 (Kortum and Lerner 2000).
Despite this public interest, it is not completely understood how public policy influences
the investment behavior of venture capital investors and thus the entrepreneurial process.
In particular, high taxes are supposed to discourage investment from a theoretical per-
spective, but — to the best of our knowledge — there is no empirical estimate of the
size of this effect. In this chapter, we address this gap in the literature by estimating
the effect of the capital gains and the dividend tax on the number of firms receiving the
first investment and on the probability of a firm receiving a follow-up investment. We
expect both tax rates to have a negative impact on the dependent variables because both
diminish the profits from investing in new ventures: the capital gains tax, which is levied
4This chapter is based on the article “The Effect of Taxes on Venture Capital Investment” which is
joint work with Ann-Kristin Achleitner and Carolin Bock of the Technische Universität München.
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on a company’s sales price, reduces the investor’s return. The dividend tax reduces the
value of the investee company to the buyer and thus the sales price of an initial public
offering (IPO) or a trade sale.
In the first part of our analysis, we measure the effect of taxes on the number of firms
receiving their first funding by venture capitalists. We use a negative binomial model to
explain the number of new ventures with the two tax rates, year- and country fixed-effects.
Our results indicate that an increase in the overall dividend tax rate has a negative effect
on the number of companies receiving their first investment. The estimated coefficient is
significantly different from zero at the one percent level and implies that a one percentage
point increase in the dividend tax rate is associated with approximately two percent fewer
companies. At a mean of 131 new companies per country and year, such a tax increase
leads to a reduction of about two newly-funded ventures. The mean estimate of the capital
gains tax is also negative, but not significantly different from zero at conventional levels.
In the second part of our analysis, we consider the influence of taxes on the probability of
venture capital-backed firms receiving a follow-up investment. As empirical model we use
a firm fixed-effects panel with probability of investment as the dependent variable and the
two tax rates as the independent variables. We find that on average an increase in the
capital gains tax rate of one percentage point reduces the probability of venture-capital
backed companies receiving a follow-up investment by two percentage points. At a mean
probability of investment of 59% in our sample, such a tax increase reduces the likelihood
of investment by around four percent relative to the mean. The estimated coefficient of
the capital gains tax is significantly different from zero at the one percent level. The mean
estimate of the overall dividend tax is negative, but not significantly different from zero
at conventional levels.
Taking these three chapters together, this dissertation offers new ideas on the determinants
of productivity and investment in times of crisis. Pending rigorous replication studies,
all findings should be viewed as preliminary. Nevertheless, we hope to contribute in
a meaningful way to positive economics, the description and explanation of economic
phenomena (Wong 1987).
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Credit Cycles in a Dynamic Duopoly
1.1 Introduction
In 2007 and 2008 there existed a widespread fear that several OECD countries would
suffer from a credit crunch. Loan losses and lower asset prices ate significantly into the
equity of the banking sector, a fact which many believed would cause banks to ration
credit. According to standard macroeconomic models, a lesser amount of available credit
leads to a reduction in investment, resulting in turn in lower production and lower welfare
(e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). However, these models do not take into
account the change in market structure which might result from the financial frictions.
For a welfare analysis, market structure is important because it directly influences prices
and the available choices for consumers. For example, if in a duopoly a smaller competitor
is unable to replace its broken machinery because of a lack of credit, he might exit the
market and leave the consumer with a monopoly supplier.
Including financial frictions in any oligopoly model is challenging because investment,
financing decisions, and market competition are inherently interdependent and dynamic:
past investment decisions determine today’s market structure which in turn influences
current investment decisions. In addition, a firm can only invest if it can finance the
outlays. Investment funds can either come from current profits (determined by today’s
market structure), retained cash (determined by past financing decisions), or new loans
(where the debt capacity is determined by future profits). To complicate matters further,
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firms rationally anticipate future investment needs and shortages in funding.
This chapter contributes to the literature on financial constraints by proposing a computa-
tionally feasible model which takes all these factors into account for the case of a dynamic
duopoly. To integrate financing and investment decisions, we introduce firms with an
endogenous capital structure and an optimizing bank into an Ericson-Pakes framework.
However, including an endogenous capital structure for each firm gives rise to a large state
space which makes a calculation of the equilibrium intractable with conventional Gauss-
Seidel and Gauss-Jacobi algorithms. Therefore, we use a variant of the novel algorithm
introduced by Fershtman and Pakes (2011) to solve our model.
Each firm is characterized by three state variables: capacity, debt level, and cash reserves.
Firms accumulate capacity over time and compete repeatedly in the product market to
earn profits. In every period, they aim to maximize the net present value of dividend
payments. For this purpose, they optimally choose production, investment, the amount
of cash to retain, and the size of debt repayments. Whatever is left of the profits after
subtracting all incurred costs is distributed as a dividend to the shareholders. Firms can
apply for a loan if the current cash flow is insufficient to cover expenses. The loan is
provided by a risk-neutral bank given that its expected return exceeds an exogenously set
minimum threshold. This threshold parametrizes the amount of credit rationing prevalent
in the market.
Using this model, we show that credit rationing serves as a propagation mechanism which
amplifies small idiosyncratic shocks to capacity. This mechanism can lead to the monop-
olization of the market. If a firm loses productive capacity through a depreciation shock,
lower current profits are available for financing investment. With well-functioning credit
markets, the firm can compensate for this loss in cash flow by increasing the amount of
credit financing. But if credit is rationed, firms might be unable to cover the cost of addi-
tional capacity. Without investment, the firm remains at the lower capacity level which is
associated with less funds. If the firm is hit by another depreciation shock which further
tightens credit constraints, its ability to react by an increase in investment is reduced
even more. Eventually, this process can lead to the exit of the firm, even if it has the
same production costs as the remaining incumbent.
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The monopolization of the market is made permanent by two other effects: first, with
credit rationing, entrants face financing constraints, too. Therefore, new firms cannot
enter because they do not obtain sufficient credit to finance initial outlays. Consequently,
the monopolization due to the credit constraints is not quickly reversed by market entry.
Second, the competing firm can expand its own capacity and market share. Increased
capacity translates into higher profits which eases credit rationing in the competitor’s in-
vestment process. In the following periods, the monopolist can then finance itself through
cash retainment, increase capacity faster, and gain a dominant position in the market.
Given these theoretical results, a recession which is accompanied by a credit crunch might
not be only “cleansing,” i.e., destroy unproductive firms (as in Caballero and Hammour
1994), but also force viable competitors out of the market. The welfare of the consumer
is reduced by higher prices caused by the ensuing monopolization. This observation
gives a rationale for government interventions which aim to increase the credit volume
available to companies. According to our model, such programs should seek in particular
to support small firms to prevent their exit or facilitate their entry. The reason is that
small companies (in contrast to large companies) do not have sufficient free cashflow to
finance investment and therefore have to rely on a functioning credit market to fund start-
up costs or growth plans. If they cannot finance investment with credit they exit or fail
to enter the market, what reduces competition and consumer welfare.
This chapter contributes to the growing literature on modeling imperfect competition with
heterogeneous firms. It is the first model to introduce financial frictions in an Ericson-
Pakes framework.1 We extend the dynamic duopoly model outlined in Besanko and
Doraszelski (2004) and Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu, and Satterthwaite (2010) by firms with
an endogenous capital structure and an optimizing bank. The larger state space resulting
from the endogenous capital structure makes it is necessary to use the new stochastic
algorithm of Fershtman and Pakes (2011) to numerically compute the equilibrium. With
this algorithm, we can solve the game much faster than with the commonly used Pakes and
McGuire (1994) or Pakes and McGuire (2001) algorithms. To the best of our knowledge,
the only other application of the Ericson-Pakes framework to finance is Kadyrzhanova
(2009), which models the effect of corporate control imperfections on industry structure.
1For a survey on this literature, see Doraszelski and Pakes (2007).
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Others have worked on financial frictions in dynamic firm models using the alternative
framework of Hopenhayn (1992). In contrast to Ericson-Pakes type models, this frame-
work considers only aggregate firm dynamics by assuming an infinite number of firms
with an infinitely small market share. Therefore, it is impossible to consider oligopoly
behavior in this framework. In addition, in the model of Hopenhayn (1992), all dynamics
are driven by permanent firm specific shocks, because temporary shocks average out. In
our model, in contrast to that, temporary idiosyncratic shocks are amplified through the
capital structure and competitive behavior. The number of applications of the modeling
framework of Hopenhayn (1992) in the finance literature is huge: for instance, Cooley and
Quadrini (2001) investigate the effect of financial frictions on firm growth. Gomes (2001)
explains the effect of financial frictions on investment. Hennessy and Whited (2005) con-
sider a dynamic trade-off model of leverage, corporate saving, and real investment to
explain debt dynamics.2
Our results are qualitatively similar to the effects described in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
which characterizes the emergence of credit cycles. Their main idea is that in downturns,
both earnings and the liquidation value of collateral are low because potential buyers are
cash-strapped. Due to the lower collateral value credit constrained firms cannot borrow
for investment, which in turn further reduces their future earnings. As the liquidation
value of the collateral is again reduced by this reduction in expected profits, a reinforcing
cycle ensues. In contrast, in our model, firms cannot borrow further money because banks
are cash strapped and the effect is transmitted via the expectations of the banking sector
and oligopoly behavior.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. We set up the model in Section 2.
Sections 3 and 4 present the results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
2Other articles modeling the intersection of investment and financial policy are, e.g., Acharya, Almeida,
and Campello (2007), Almeida and Campello (2007), Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2009) Moyen
(2004), Titman and Tsyplakov (2007), and Adam, Dasgupta, and Titman (2007). See Hubbard (1998)
and Stein (2003) for reviews of this literature.
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1.2 A Duopoly with Endogenous Capital Structure
1.2.1 Static Framework: The Optimization of the Firm
Assume that there are two firms which compete repeatedly in the same market and there
exists one risk-neutral bank. Each firm i ∈ {1, 2} is fully characterized by its capacity
(q̄i), its debt level (di), and its cash reserves (ci). To simplify the notation we combine the
value of these state variables of the two firms to the industry state s = (q̄1, q̄2, d1, d2, c1, c2),
which is common knowledge.
In every period, each firm can choose an action set a = (INV,∆debt,∆cash) to change the
value of its state variable if it has enough funds to cover the associated costs. A firm
can decide to add one unit of capacity (INV = 1) by incurring the expansion costs η
or remain inactive (INV = 0). It can pay back the amount ∆debt of debt or increase its
cash reserves by ∆cash. The total costs of an action set are the sum of interest payments,
the investment cost, the amount used for debt repayment, and the increase of the cash
reserve:
cost(a, s)i = r · di + η · INVi + ∆debt,i + ∆cash,i
where r is the interest rate paid by the firm. These costs must be covered with the current
profits (πi), the cash reserves, and the available line of credit (credit(a, s)i). If this is the
case, the action set is in the set of feasible actions A(s).3
Each firm acts in the interest of its sharholders and chooses the action set a∗ which
maximizes the expected discounted value of dividend payments in every period:
a∗ = arg max
a∈A(s)
W (a, s).
where W (a, s) is the expected value of dividends if action a is chosen in the industry state
s. The expected value of this dividend stream is given by
W (a, s) = div(a, s) + βEa′,s′ [W (a′, s′)|a, s]
3For the sake of readability we suppress the subscript i in the following.
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where E[·] is the expectation operator, β is the discount factor, s′ is next period’s state,
and a′ is next period’s action. The dividend payments are the positive difference of current
profits and the costs from the action set
div(a, s) = min{π − costs(a, s), 0}.
1.2.2 Dynamic Framework: State to State Transition
In the following, we outline the law of motion for each state variable in turn. At the end
of this section, we describe what happens if firms are bankrupt, exit, or enter the market.
 Capacity: A firm can choose to add one capacity unit (INV = 1) or remain inactive
(INV = 0). With an exogenous probability δ, the current capacity is reduced by one unit
because of depreciation. Therefore, the next period’s capacity q̄′ of a firm with capacity
q̄ is determined by:
q̄′ =

q̄ + 1 with probability (1 − δ) if INV = 1
q̄ with probability δ if INV = 1 and with probability (1 − δ) if INV = 0
q̄ − 1 with probability δ if INV = 0.
If the firm decides to add capacity and no depreciation shock takes place, the capacity is
increased by one. The capacity is decreased if there is no investment and a depreciation
shocks hits the firm. It stays constant in all other cases.
As capacity is added and subtracted in discrete steps, it is treated as lumpy in our
model. This is in line with the (s, S) modeling tradition of capacity adjustment (e.g.
Caballero and Engel 1999, Caplin and Leahy 2010), prior work on Ericson-Pakes models
(e.g. Besanko and Doraszelski 2004, Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu, and Satterthwaite 2010),
and empirical evidence. For example, Doms and Dunne (1998) show that in U.S. census
data a significant amount of investment adjustment takes place in a relatively short period
of time, while most periods are characterized by only minor changes. In their sample,
25% percent of total investment derives from firms that adjust their capital stock in a
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given year by more than 30% percent.
 Debt and Cash reserves: The costs associated with every action set are financed
by current profits, a reduction of the cash reserves and/or with debt (in that order).
Accordingly, the law of motion of the cash reserve is given by
c′ = c+ ∆cash − min{max{cost(a, s) − π, 0}, c}
Cash tomorrow is cash today plus the additional cash put into reserves less the amount
necessary to cover the costs of the action set. If current profits and cash reserves are not
sufficient to cover all costs, the firm can finance them with new debt. The law of motion
of debt is
d′ = d− ∆debt + min{max{cost(a, s) − π − c, 0}, credit(a, s)}
where max{cost(a, s)−π−c, 0} is new borrowing and credit(a, s) is the credit limit. Debt
in the next period is debt today minus the amount of debt repaid plus what is left to
finance after the cash reserve is used up.
Although this hierarchy of finance looks strict, it is not: for example, firms can at the same
time use cash and increase their cash reserves by choosing a high ∆cash, thus increasing
the percentage of debt financing. The only thing that is not possible is to rely on cash
reserves and debt financing without using all current cash flow π. The hierarchy of finance
approach is in line with the pecking order theory of Myers (1984).4
 Market exit and entry: Two exemptions to the laws of motion outlined above exist:
the exit and the entry of a firm. A firm exits the market if it is either bankrupt or all its
capacity is depreciated. Firm i is bankrupt if it is unable to pay its due interest payments
out of current profits and retained cash, i.e.,
π + c− r · d < 0.
The remainder of the cash reserve is given to the bank and the firm vanishes from the
4It is necessary to introduce this hierarchy of finance for technical reasons. Restricting the choice
space immensely simplifies the calculation of the equilibrium, because it reduces the number of follow-up
states that must be considered to compute the continuation value of the firm. An alternative would be
to rewrite the model in continuous time (Doraszelski and Satterthwaite 2010).
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market. The bankruptcy process imposes an upper bound on the total amount of debt,
precludes Ponzi games, and limits the size of the state space. If a firm exits, the possibility
arises for an entrant to become the second player in the market. The new player has no
capacity and no debt, but has the amount ce of cash from equity investors.
1.2.3 The Optimization of the Financial Intermediary
In every period, the bank offers the firm a credit limit conditionally on the action taken
by the firm, the industry state, and the required minimum return R of the loan. This
line of credit is determined by the difference of the expected discounted sum of payments
which the bank receives from the firm with the credit (VBank(a, s)) and the amount in
case the credit is not granted (VBank(ã∗, s)) adjusted by the return R
credit(a, s) = VBank(a, s) − VBank(ã∗, s)
R
, (1.1)
where ã∗ is the optimal action the firm would take if no credit is given. Thus the bank
is ready to grant a credit limit if it receives at least a return of R per unit of credit in
expected repayment from the firm.
The expected discounted sum of payments it will receive from a firm is given by
VBank(a, s) ≡ E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtBank(r · dt + ∆debt,t − dnew)
]
where βBank = 11+rBank is the discount factor and rBank is the interest rate of the savers.
In every period, the bank receives interest payments r · d and repayments ∆debt from
the firm. To account for the repayment to the savers, we subtract the net present
value of all interest payments and the repayment of the principal at the time the loan
is granted. By construction, this is exactly the value of the newly obtained credit
dnew = min{max{cost(a, s) − π − c, 0}.
Credit rationing is more severe if the required return R for loans is larger, i.e., the repay-
ment per unit of credit must be higher. The functional form (1.1) is inspired by the credit
crunch model of Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Assume that there exist three types of
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agents: a continuum of firms, uninformed investors, and a continuum of banks. In each
period, every firm has one project with a different return. The investor would like to
invest in these projects, but is unable to prevent the firm from diverting the funds to only
privately profitable projects. The bank can perfectly rule out such bad projects by moni-
toring the firms’ efforts. However, it cannot credibly commit to do so because monitoring
entails non-verifiable private costs. Consequently, the uninformed investor is willing to
employ the bank as a monitor only if the bank invests a fixed amount of its own capital
in the firm, too. This makes it privately optimal for the bank to control the firm. Since
the bank has only a finite amount of equity, it can only fund a limited number of firms.
In order to choose which project to fund, the intermediary sorts the projects from the
highest return to the lowest. Starting with the most profitable project, the bank gives
loans to projects with lower and lower returns until all its equity is pledged. The excess
return on the loan (corrected for its costs), which just attracts funding is denoted R. This
return therefore entails a scarcity rent which might be high if a credit crunch has eaten
up all of the bank’s equity.
In our model, we set the return R exogenously and time invariant, to parameterize the
amount of credit rationing. This implies that throughout the economy, the return distri-
bution of projects is stable and the banks do not raise equity. If a firm in the considered
duopoly can deliver in expected value the return R, it gets the loan, otherwise the loan
is given to some other firm in the economy.
1.2.4 Timing
At the beginning of each period, the bank decides how much credit it offers to each firm.
At the same time, if a firm is unable to pay its due interest payment out of its current cash
flow, the firm declares bankruptcy and exits. Next, each firm is privately informed about
its cost of capacity addition η. Conditional on these investment costs and the amount
of available credit, each firm takes its optimal action. Then both firms compete in the
product market. At the end of the period, capacity is subject to depreciation and all
decisions are implemented.
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1.2.5 Equilibrium Concept and Computation
We focus our attention on a symmetric Experience Based Markov Equilibrium (EBE).
An EBE consists of (i) a subset of the set of possible states (the recurrent class), (ii) a
vector of strategies which is optimal given the equilibrium continuation values from (iii),
and (iii) a vector of continuation values for every state which is consistent with optimal
actions defined in (ii). The concept of EBE as defined in Fershtman and Pakes (2011) is
a similar, but a weaker concept than Markov Perfect Equilibrium because it is sufficient
to calculate optimal policies on the recurrent class of states. A state is a member of the
recurrent class if it is visited infinitely often in infinite time.
To solve for the EBE, we use a variant of the reinforcement learning algorithm outlined
in Fershtman and Pakes (2011). We describe the computation, the merits and problems
of this algorithm in Appendix A.4.
1.2.6 Parameterization
 State space & choice set: To enable computation, we discretize the state space in
all three dimensions of the state space to multiples of five units starting with a value of
zero. Therefore, a firm in the first capacity state has a capacity of zero, in the second a
capacity of 5, in the third a capacity of 10 and so on. The spacing is discretionary but
this one is common in the literature (Besanko and Doraszelski 2004). Furthermore, we
restrict the maximum capacity to 45, the debt to 195, and the cash to 95 units. These
bounds are arbitrary but high enough so that they are never reached in equilibrium play.
To ensure that firms stay within the state space, we have to restrict the potential choices
of ∆debt and ∆cash to multiples of five with a finite upper bound.
 Single period profit: Firms compete in quantities which are less than or equal to
the firm’s capacity. Consequently, we use the profit function (π = π(q̄i, q̄j)) for capacity
constraint quantity competition with the same parameters as Besanko and Doraszelski
(2004). The derivation is outlined in Appendix A.1 and illustrated in Figure 1.1.
 Investment: The investment costs η are random and are private information to the
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Figure 1.1: Profit of firm 1
firm as in Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu, and Satterthwaite (2010). They are determined by
ηi,t = 50 + 5 · ψi,t,
where
• the minimum construction costs are 50, which are the same for both firms and
constant over time
• 5 · ψi,t are project specific costs. ψi,t is a random variable, drawn anew from a
Beta(3,3) distribution with support [0,1] independently for each firm and each pe-
riod. ψi,t is private information for firm i and captures the idea that project oppor-
tunities are not the same for both firms and change over time.
Incorporating random investment costs and incomplete information is now common prac-
tice in the simulation of Ericson-Pakes models (e.g. Ryan 2009, Besanko, Doraszelski, Lu,
and Satterthwaite 2010). It is realistic that firms do not exactly know the expansion costs
of the rival. Furthermore, random investment costs make it possible to use the purifica-
tion techniques of Doraszelski and Satterthwaite (2010) to ensure the computability of
the equilibrium.
Following Gomes (2001), who matches the investment and capital data obtained from
Compustat, we set the probability of depreciation to δ = 12%.
 Entry: The expected value of the amount of financing available to an entrant, the cash
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state of the entrant ce, is set to 50% of the expected average investment costs η. Thus ce
is determined by
ce = 25 + 2.5 · ψei,t,
where ψei is a random variable drawn from a Beta(3,3) distribution with support [0,1] in
every period. Again this random component of ce ensures computability. We explore the
sensitivity of our results to this assumption in the robustness section.
 Financial parameters: The yearly interest rate is set to r = 6.5% and the interest
rate for savers to rBank = 4.5%. This matches the real interest rate over the last century
and the average interest rate spread of 2% between 1968 and 1997 (Gomes 2001).
In the simulation we consider two degrees of credit rationing: R = 5% and R = 120%.
These two values are arbitrary but well illustrate the mechanisms at work. We demon-
strate the effect of other values of R in the robustness section. Without credit rationing
the loan must deliver at least 5% return in net present value terms compared to the case
that the loan is not given. The firm must be able to pay interest for two years and return
the principal to obtain such a loan. In the case of credit rationing, R is set to 120%. Such
a return cannot be met by interest payments on the given credit alone, but there must
be an additional future value for the bank. For example, the loan could ensure that a
debt-laden firm survives and pays back more of its debt. Another possibility is that the
loan helps a new firm to enter which relies heavily on the bank in future play.
1.3 The Effects of Financial Frictions on the Equilib-
rium Capacity Distribution
1.3.1 Equilibrium Capacity Distribution and Welfare Results
In this section, we demonstrate that credit rationing can lead to the monopolization
of markets and thus to a loss in welfare. To show the effect of financial frictions on the
market structure in equilibrium, we discuss in the following the properties of the invariant
equilibrium capacity distribution in the market. Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2 picture the
equilibrium capacity distribution for the case without credit rationing (R = 5%) on the
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left hand side and with credit rationing (R = 120%) on the right hand side. A higher
probability of a certain industry structure indicates that this industry structure is more
likely to occur in equilibrium play. For example, without credit rationing, the industry
configuration with firm 1 and a firm 2 in the second capacity state (i.e. both are of size
10) is played with a probability of 25%. With credit rationing, the most likely market
structure is one large firm in the third capacity state (with a capacity of 15) and the other
firm with no capacity at all.
Credit rationing causes the equilibrium distribution to become skewed: one firm exits
the market and the equally productive competitor becomes the monopolist. There is an
equal probability that firm 1 or firm 2 is the monopolist, reflecting the symmetric set-up
of the model. The large firm is in the fourth capacity state with a capacity of 15 and
the small firm has no capacity at all in the most likely industry structure. There is some
probability mass in between the two extreme configurations, indicating that leadership
changes from time to time. Without financial frictions, the most likely configuration is
that both firms have an equal size with a capacity of ten. Due to the randomness in the
investment and depreciation process there is also some probability for asymmetric market
share configurations.
These findings complement the results of Caballero and Hammour (1994) on the cleansing
effect of recessions: they find that a fall in demand during a recession leads to job destruc-
tion, which they conjecture is due to the exit of technical inefficient firms. A recession
is therefore “cleansing” for an economy. In our model all firms are equally productive
in the sense that all firms have the same production costs. Therefore, credit rationing
(which often accompanies a fall in demand) leads to the exit of a firm which has the same
production costs as the remaining incumbent. This effect bears some resemblance to the
“scarring” effect of recessions outlined in Ouyang (2009). In that article, firms’ learning-
by-doing is reduced by the lower volumes produced in a recession killing potentially good
firms in their infancy. In contrast, in the present model, firms are only constrained by
financial factors.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium distribution for R = 5% (left) and R = 120% (right)
Note: The capacity states of the two firms are depicted on the x- and y-axis. In the upper panel the
probability of a state is displayed on the z-axis. In the lower panel the probability is shown by different
colors.
The monopolization of the market leads to a welfare loss (Table 1.2) which is mainly
borne by consumers and banks. The welfare loss of the consumer originates from lower
capacities and higher prices as shown in the summary statistics of Table 1.3. Banks have
lower profits because the amount of credit (on which they earn a fixed income) is smaller
(the amount of debt is lower) with credit rationing. In contrast to the reduction of surplus
for consumers and banks, the firm surplus stays approximately the same. The reason is
simple: with credit rationing, a firm has with (approximately) equal probability monopoly
and zero profits, whereas without financial frictions, it has duopoly profits for sure. Thus,
in expected value, 50% monopoly profits is a bit larger than 100% of the duopoly profit.
Therefore, if firms are risk neutral, they do not suffer from credit rationing.
All other statistics in Table 1.3 are in line with expectations: the average debt level is
19
Credit Cycles in a Dynamic Duopoly
Table 1.1: Probability that a state is played in equilibrium (in percentage)
(a) R = 5%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i=2 q̄i = 5 0 1 5 6 1 0
i=3 q̄i = 10 0 5 25 15 2 0
i=4 q̄i = 15 0 6 15 6 0 0
i=5 q̄ = 20 0 1 2 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
(b) R = 120%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 0 1 6 15 7 3
i=2 q̄i = 5 1 1 3 2 0 0
i=3 q̄i = 10 6 3 4 2 0 0
i=4 q̄i = 15 15 2 2 0 0 0
i=5 q̄i = 20 7 0 0 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 3 0 0 0 0 0
Note: i and j denote the value of the capacity state of firms i and j.
Table 1.2: Welfare effects of credit rationing
Surplus Consumer Producer Bank Total
Model with credit rationing 14.72 35.95 0.61 51.28
Model without credit rationing 24.19 35.03 2.38 61.60
Difference -9.46 0.92 -1.77 -10.32
Note: This is the expected welfare over all states. For the calculation of these measures please refer to
Appendix A.2.
Table 1.3: Summary statistics
Capacity Price Debt Cash
Model with credit rationing 8.90 2.35 7.44 18.37
Model without credit rationing 11.25 1.83 26.53 13.20
Difference -2.35 0.52 -19.09 5.17
lower and the amount of retained cash is higher when credit rationing is present. If the
financial market is not working properly firms get fewer and smaller loans and try to
finance themselves through the retainment of cash.5
5Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) use a similar reasoning to justify cash flow sensitivities of
cash as a sensible measure for financial constraints.
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1.3.2 Credit Rationing as Propagation Mechanism
Approximately every eight periods a depreciation shock hits each firm. This initially small
shock sets a process in motion which results in a skewed equilibrium distribution given
that credit rationing is present.
The propagation mechanism works as follows: a shock reduces the capacity of firm i.
Lower capacity translates into lower current profits. Because of credit rationing, this loss
in profit cannot be compensated by taking out more loans. With lower cash flow and
insufficient available credit, the probability that a firm can afford the costs of capacity
expansion is reduced. A reduction in investment together with an unaltered probability of
depreciation results in less capacity, what again triggers less investment. The competitor
benefits from this mechanism: the original shock reduces the capacity on the market and
increases the price level. Therefore, the competitor has more profit available for saving
and investment. With this additional profit, he can increase his investment in order to
further tighten the credit constraints of the smaller firm.
To illustrate, we now compare the different investment probabilities with and without
credit constraints given that a firm is hit by a depreciation shock. Assume that in a
market with credit rationing, the capacity of a firm in state (3,3) is reduced by one
unit so the firm finds itself in state (2,3). Then the investment probability with credit
rationing is 27%, much smaller than in the case without, where the firm invests with a
probability of 66% (Tables 1.4a and 1.4b). After the first shock, the larger competitor
has on average an investment probability of 27%. This is still a reduction, albeit a much
smaller one, from the investment probability of 41% without financial frictions. Therefore,
the key observation is here that the investment probability of the smaller firm is reduced
by 1 − 0.270.66 = 59% while the investment probability of the larger firm is reduced only
by 34% compared to the case without credit rationing.6 This relatively larger reduction
in the ability to invest makes it more likely that the smaller firm exits the market: if it
fails to reinvest, the firm might be hit by another depreciation shock. Furthermore, if the
competitor invests (and the other firm fails to do so), the capacity state evolves to (2,4),
reducing the investment probability of the smaller firm further to 15%.
6The reduction in the neutral (2,2) state is 40.5% to 44% with credit rationing from 74% without.
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Figure 1.3: Investment probabilities for Firm 1, R = 5% (left) and R = 120% (right)
Table 1.4: Investment probability for firm 1 in percentage
(a) R = 5%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 94 98 94 92 96 100
i=2 q̄i = 5 98 74 66 49 54 73
i=3 q̄i = 10 51 41 7 5 8 13
i=4 q̄i = 15 23 6 1 0 0 0
i=5 q̄i = 20 14 2 1 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 0 0 1 0 0 0
(b) R = 120%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 72 39 7 2 3 4
i=2 q̄i = 5 63 44 27 15 18 14
i=3 q̄i = 10 25 27 8 3 5 4
i=4 q̄i = 15 6 10 1 0 0 0
i=5 q̄i = 20 5 5 1 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 3 3 1 0 0 0
Note: This is the average investment probability in each capacity state. Investment probabilities also
depend on the debt state and the amount of retained cash. States written in grey are played in
equilibrium with a probability below 0.1% and are likely calculated with error. i and j denote the value
of the capacity state of firms i and j.
The effect is driven by the differing optimal probabilities that investment is carried out
with and without credit rationing (Table 1.4). Because the analysis is ceteris paribus,
this difference can only originate from the amount of credit available to the firms: with
R = 5%, abundant credit is extended in any state (Table 1.6a) and the firm does not
need to delay any investment. With credit rationing, only 6 units of credit are offered by
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Table 1.5: Sum of current profits, retained cash and credit with R = 120% for firm 1
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 55 40 30 28 28 29
i=2 q̄i = 5 59 39 35 30 30 24
i=3 q̄i = 10 49 48 40 33 31 29
i=4 q̄i = 15 45 49 43 32 30 27
i=5 q̄i = 20 44 52 45 43 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 44 61 48 42 0 0
Note: This is the average amount available for investment in each capacity state. This amount is also
dependent on the debt state and the amount of cash retained. States written in grey are played in
equilibrium with a probability below 0.1% and are likely calculated with error. i and j denote the value
of the capacity state of firms i and j.
the financial intermediary (Table 1.6b). This lack of credit drives down the equilibrium
investment probability.
Table 1.6: Credit for firm 1
(a) R = 5%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 899 436 338 236 229 308
i=2 q̄i = 5 338 228 198 76 66 37
i=3 q̄i = 10 47 44 14 4 6 4
i=4 q̄i = 15 44 8 0 0 0 0
i=5 q̄i = 20 27 1 1 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 1 0 0 0 0 0
(b) R = 120%
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 27 12 2 0 0 1
i=2 q̄i = 5 20 11 6 3 3 2
i=3 q̄i = 10 3 3 1 0 1 0
i=4 q̄i = 15 1 1 0 0 0 0
i=5 q̄i = 20 1 0 0 0 0 0
i=6 q̄i = 25 1 0 0 0 0 0
Note: This is the average amount of credit offered in each capacity state. The amount of credit is
dependent also on the debt state and the amount of cash retained. States written in grey are played in
equilibrium with a probability below 0.1% and are likely calculated with error. i and j denote the value
of the capacity state of firms i and j.
The described qualitative results are similar to those of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
however the mechanism is different. In their model, a negative productivity shock reduces
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the net worth of the credit constrained firm. This leads to a reduction in investment in the
productive factor which is also a collateral for credit. The resulting shortfall in demand
for the productive factor reduces its value as collateral. Consequently, the firm cannot
get as much credit as before. This reduces the demand for the productive factor further,
drives down the net worth of the constrained firm again and the firm enters a reinforcing
credit cycle.
In our model, firms hit by a depreciation shock are unable to tap the credit market to
finance investment. The bank does not offer enough credit because the expected net
present value of the investment is not high enough to satisfy the return requirements.
Without investment, the firm’s capital stock depreciates further resulting again in reduced
credit and reduced current profits. In the end, this mechanism can lead to the exit of one
firm.
1.3.3 Credit Rationing as Entry Barrier
If one firm exits, the possibility arises for an entrant to become the second firm in the
market. However, the monopolization of the market is (relatively) stable because credit
rationing also serves as a barrier to entry. Thus, financial frictions lead to lower entry
rates which in turn results in a skewed capacity distribution.
In the basic configuration, investment costs are uniformly distributed between 50 and
55 and the amount of start-up financing provided by the equity markets is between 20
and 25. Therefore, the firm has to take at least an amount of 25 as credit to enter
the market.7 If credit rationing is present, the entrant only receives such an amount of
credit in case the competitor is out of the market or small, i.e. if the competitor is in
the first or second capacity state (Table 1.6). Hence, the investment probabilities are
only high in these states, but not when the competitor has more capacity (Table 1.4).
The investment probability is 72% for firm 1, given that no firm is in the market. With a
competitor in the second capacity state, the investment probability decreases to 39%. The
investment probability becomes neglegible if the capacity of the competitor is higher. On
the equilibrium path, the monopolist is out of the market or small with only a probability
7Profits in the outside state are zero.
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of 1% (Table 1.1b). Credit rationing therefore serves as an effective barrier to entry.
In contrast, without credit rationing, the probability to invest for an entrant is always
above 90% irrespective of the competitor’s capacity (Table 1.4). Consequently, a firm
with zero capacity always enters the market immediately.
1.4 Robustness
To show that the outlined results are stable despite the multiplicity of assumptions made,
we vary three key parameters in our model: the severeness of credit rationing R, the
maximum possible amount of retained cash, and the amount of start-up financing ce.
Furthermore, we explore the implications of incomplete information on the equilibrium
capacity distribution.
 Severeness of credit rationing: In Figure 1.4, we gradually increase the severeness of
credit rationing. We find that with an increase in the minimum return R, the probability
of an asymmetric equilibrium capacity distribution increases. This is intuitive: the more
banks tighten the credit constraint, the more adverse is the effect.
 Maximum amount of retainable cash: In the preceding analysis, firms were able
to accumulate a large amount of cash. The limit was set to 100, the equivalent of two
capacity blocks or approximately five periods of profit. However, in reality, shareholders
might have an incentive to limit the amount of cash a company can hold, to mitigate
moral hazard problems: if a manager must regularly apply for funds, the capital market
controls their proper use (Jensen 1986, Easterbrook 1984).
Figure 1.5 presents the equilibrium distribution with varying amounts of maximum re-
tainable cash. The effects of credit rationing become more severe if a company can retain
less cash.
 Increase in start-up financing Throughout the main part of the analysis, entrants
only had a limited amount φe of start-up financing. This can be thought of as the amount
a start-up can raise on the equity market. This small scale is intuitive because the moni-
toring service of the bank is only needed if investment projects without monitoring achieve
a negative net present value due to severe moral hazard. Consequently, naive investors
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Figure 1.4: Equilibrium distribution with varying amount of credit rationing
(a) R = 5%, Cash=100 (b) R = 40%, Cash=100
(c) R = 80%, Cash=100 (d) R = 120%, Cash=100
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Figure 1.5: Equilibrium distribution with varying amount of retainable cash
(a) R = 50%, Cash=0 (b) R = 50%, Cash=20
(c) R = 50%, Cash=80 (d) R = 50%, Cash=100
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Figure 1.6: Equilibrium distribution with varying start-up financing
(a) R = 120%, φe=20 (b) R = 120%, φe=25
(c) R = 120%, φe=35 (d) R = 120%, φe=50
are not willing to finance start-ups on a large scale in such a market.
In our analysis, the size of start-up financing is 50% of the investment an entrant needs to
enter the market. If we increase this proportion, the effects of credit rationing are smaller.
This result is illustrated in Figure 1.6.
Incomplete information: In the whole analysis, we allow the firms to condition
on the complete industry state s = (q̄i, q̄j, di, dj, ci, cj). However, the assumption that
each firm knows the exact financial structure of its competitor might be rather extreme.
Fortunately, the Fershtman and Pakes (2011) algorithm allows to introduce incomplete
information in the Ericson-Pakes framework. If we let firms condition their strategy only
on their own financial structure and the two capacity states, the results are qualitatively
similar to the full information case (Figure 1.7).
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium distribution with incomplete information for R = 5% (left) and
R = 120% (right)
1.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we describe the effects of credit rationing on the equilibrium market
structure in a duopoly. We employ the Experience Based Markov Equilibrium framework
presented in Fershtman and Pakes (2011) to extend the model of Besanko and Doraszelski
(2004) by an optimizing bank and firms which actively choose their capital structure.
In our model, firms can retain cash, borrow from banks, or use current cash flow to finance
themselves. Due to a shortage of capital, banks might be unable to fund every profitable
project. Therefore, credit rationing might prevail. If then a small shock reduces the
capacity of a firm, this firm might find itself unable to finance capacity expansion. Without
investment, it has also less funds to finance investment in future periods. Eventually, this
lack of investment can lead to the exit of one firm and monopolization of the market.
The monopolization is stable because new entrants also suffer from credit rationing and
cannot enter to fill the void.
This chapter shows that in equilibrium, the exit of firms during a recession might not
be driven by insufficient productivity but by a lack of credit financing. Therefore, policy
makers should put emphasis on the functioning of the credit market during recessions to
prevent welfare losses through an increase in market power. For example the government
could introduce credit support programs for small companies and start-ups. According to
our model, such programs could foster competition and thus increase overall welfare.
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Chapter 2
The Allocation of Talent: Evidence
from the Market of Economists
2.1 Introduction
There is a growing interest within labor economics in the effect of macroeconomic con-
ditions on microeconomic outcomes. In particular, recent studies have found a strong
and persistent negative impact of recessions on individuals’ employment and earnings.1
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there is no study which examines whether individuals
react to these recession shocks in terms of occupational choice and the potential impact
the reaction might have on talent allocation and productivity across sectors. Our study
fills this gap in the literature by looking at a specific market where individual skills can
readily be measured—academia.
We study the impact of the business cycle on skill allocation in the academic labor mar-
ket. This is done by relating the research productivity and career choice of (potential)
economists graduating from the top 30 US universities to measures of the business cycle
during the last 50 years. To guide our empirics, we develop a Roy-style model (1951)
of the selection of talent between business and academia, where entering academia is
competitive but attractive during recessions. This model predicts that fewer economists
1See, for example, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2011), Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),
Kahn (2010), Kondo (2008), Oyer (2006), Oyer (2008).
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who faced a recession at time of application to the PhD program stay in academia after
graduation. Those who do stay are positively selected on academic productivity. More-
over, if there is a recession at the time of graduation, more economists pursue academic
employment, which leads to more publications per PhD graduate.
The results of the empirical analysis support the theoretical predictions. In particular,
they show that individuals do react to recession shocks. Economists applying or graduat-
ing during recessions publish significantly more than economists applying or graduating
in a boom. A recession at entry leads to fewer PhD students staying in academia, a
recession at graduation has the opposite effect. Moreover, the effects are of economically
substantial magnitude. Taking our estimates literally, we expect assistant professors from
the cohort of graduate students who applied for the PhD during the recession of 2008 (3.5
percentage points increase in unemployment) to be around 24 percent more productive
than assistant professors from a cohort applying in an average year (0 percent unemploy-
ment change). We also expect PhD graduates from 2008 to produce on average 20 percent
more publications in their early careers than economists graduating in an average year.
Our results contribute to several discussions in the academic literature: First, they show
that individuals strongly and persistently react to (temporary) shocks in terms of career
choice, which leads to a change in the allocation of talent between sectors. This adds to
the broader debate about the allocation of talent, especially in the financial sector and in
teaching.2 Second, by observing that individuals at the top of the skill distribution switch
between sectors, we infer that they possess general ex-ante talents and that even ex-post,
after six years of specific PhD training, some individuals’ skills are general enough to go
back to the private sector. This relates to the born versus made debate in labor economics
(e.g. Bertrand 2009, Oyer 2008). Third, we note that the predictions of a Roy-style model
are supported by the data in our quasi-experimental empirical setting. Fourth, our results
imply that it is possible to lure talent to research by increasing compensation.
For our empirical analysis we construct a new dataset of economists’ career choices and
publication output from publicly available sources. The dataset consists of graduation
years and the degree granting universities of 13,624 PhDs since 1955 from the top 30
2See, for example, Corcoran, Evans, and Schwab (2004), Bacolod (2007), and Philippon and Reshef
(2009).
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American institutions. We match each person with all their publications available on
JStor and with an indicator for becoming a faculty member or a member of the American
Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Thus, we can calculate the propensity to stay
in academia and the publication output for each economist. Finally, we aggregate each
cohort according to university and graduation year, and match different business cycle
indicators (recession dummies, GDP growth, and unemployment rates and their changes)
at time of application to and at time of graduation from a PhD program. We quantify the
influence of the business cycle indicators in both points in time on economists’ propensity
to decide in favor of academic employment and on their productivity.
Our study is closely related to three distinct strands of the literature. First, as mentioned
above, we contribute to the recent literature that analyzes the effect of business cycle
shocks on individuals’ careers. Kahn (2010) finds large and persistent negative wage
effects of graduating from college in a worse economy. Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and
Heisz (2011) show that university graduates who enter the labor market during a recession
experience a substantial initial loss of earnings, which fades only after 8–10 years, but that
more highly skilled graduates suffer less because they switch to better firms rapidly.3 Our
study is the first to look at highly skilled individuals’ response to these recession shocks
by changing careers and its effect on the skill composition in one of the affected sectors.
The results are consistent with those of Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2011), as
we find that more highly skilled individuals (are able to) respond more strongly.
The second strand of the literature to which we contribute is concerned with sorting in
the labor market. While the papers above generally find that vertical, non-voluntary
sorting (i.e., worse job placements whose effects are long-lasting) is the source of the
negative impact of recession shocks, we consider horizontal, somewhat more voluntary
sorting (i.e., the individual’s decision to continue their career in a different sector). In
two papers in 2006 and 2008, Paul Oyer estimates the effect of vertical sorting on long
term earnings and productivity by instrumenting MBAs’ and economists’ first placements
with the state of the economy at the time of graduation. Combining Oyer’s paper and
our results on economics PhDs, it may well be that we underestimate the strength of our
3Other papers in this strand of the literature include Sullivan and von Wachter (2009),von Wachter,
Song, and Manchester (2008), and Kondo (2008).
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selection effect because of his placement effect and vice versa.4
There are plenty of well-known studies that are concerned with the sectoral selection of
skills and the empirical content of the Roy model. Most of these papers employ “struc-
tural” econometric techniques while our quasi-experimental study doesn’t need to rely on
specific distributional assumptions about skills, for example.5 We nonetheless find strong
empirical support for the predictions of the Roy model. Another influential recent study
by Philippon and Reshef (2009) describes the relationship between relative wages and
human capital in the financial sector in the United States over the last century, but is
unable to establish a causal effect of the former on the latter. In contrast, we are able
to shed some light on the causal relationship between sectoral attractiveness and talent
allocation.6
The third strand of the literature this chapter deals with is concerned with the deter-
minants of scientific productivity and their potential policy implications. Our study is
most closely related to the papers that examine the impact of science funding on research
productivity. Funding increases, like recessions in our context, raise the attractiveness
of the academic sector compared to the private sector. Goolsbee (1998) shows that up
to 50% of a government spending increase goes into higher salaries for scientists and en-
gineers. Suggesting that the supply of such knowledge workers is relatively inelastic, he
argues that a large fraction of governmental research funding may in fact be ineffective
and may only constitute a windfall gain for scientists. On the contrary, our results imply
that the quantity and/or quality of researchers should strongly and persistently increase
with more funding.
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. We derive our theoretical predictions
from a modified version of the Roy Model in the next section. Then we describe how we
assembled our novel dataset of PhD economists’ publication success. Section 2.4 presents
and interprets the empirical results, while the conclusion discusses to what extent our
results may generalize to other segments of the labor market.
4For a more detailed explanation, see Section 2.4.3.
5See Heckman and Honoré (1990) and, more recently, Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Lee and Wolpin
(2006). An example of another non-structural paper on the Roy model is Borjas (1987).
6One paper that uses quasi-experimental identification to study sectoral selection is Bedard and Her-
man (2008). They examine the impact of economic contractions on the likelihood for enrollment in an
advanced university degree program.
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2.2 Theory
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with
the state of the business cycle. This section modifies a standard Roy (1951) model for
the problem at hand. The Roy model analyzes the self-selection of individuals with
heterogeneous skills into sectors according to their highest expected earnings. In the
following, we model two sectors—academia and business—into which individuals can self-
select. Every individual has distinct skills (and therefore different wages) in each sector
but can choose only one occupation. The main departure from the original Roy framework
is that compensation in business and academia vary with the business cycle and that the
number of open positions in academia is assumed to be fixed.
2.2.1 Assumptions
Suppose that individuals are endowed with two skills, an academic skill α and a business
skill β. There are two sectors, academia (A) and business (B), which produce outputs
utilizing the respective skills. Individuals maximize their expected lifetime compensation
by applying for jobs in academia or business. This compensation implicitly consists of a
pecuniary and a non-pecuniary component, where the non-pecuniary component might
be particularly important in the academic sector (see Stern (2004)).
The business sector is assumed to hire anyone offering a compensation wt. We assume
that the compensation depends linearly on the skill level β of the employee and the state
of business cycle ỹt:
wB(β) = β + ỹt.
An employee’s lifetime compensation in the business sector is higher in a boom (high ỹt)
and lower in a recession (low ỹt). In academia, total compensation also varies with the
business cycle but is less cyclical than in the business sector:
wA(α) = α + aỹt
with 0 < a < 1.
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Two sources might contribute to the variability of compensation over the business cycle:
First, in a recession, lower immediate wages can lead to a lower lifetime compensation
in both setors. Second, during recessions employees might enter inferior career paths in
business or start at a lower ranked institution in academia, which could hurt lifetime
income and non-pecuniary benefits. This is consistent with recent articles document-
ing substantial effects of the current business cycle on long term career outcomes (e.g.
Oyer 2008, Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2011). Importantly, we assume that the
academic sector is less cyclical than the business sector and we provide empirical evidence
supporting this assumption in Appendix B.3.
In order to become an academic, an individual must decide for academia twice: first by
applying to a PhD program (at time of application t = app) and a second time by pursuing
an assistant professorship after the PhD (at graduation t = grad). At time of application,
we assume that PhD programs admit the best N applicants according to academic skill
and that there are always more applicants than available spaces.7 Thus, the entry into
the doctoral program is competitive. This assumption seems reasonable as we consider
the top 30 PhD programs in the US only.
At graduation, we assume that the student can choose freely if he wants to stay in
academia or enter the business sector instead. This assumption is more disputable: obtain-
ing an assistant professorship at a (top)ranked institution is very competitive. However,
conditioned on graduating from one of the top 30 US economics departments, it seems
unlikely that a student cannot secure an academic job in a lower ranked institution, a
teaching college, a university outside the United States, or a postdoc position even in
times of recession.
When taking his decision to apply for a PhD program, the applicant should also take
account of the option value of having another choice about his career path after gradua-
tion. To simplify our problem, we assume that this option value is a constant, i.e. that it
does not vary with the state of the macroeconomy at the time of application.8 Thus, we
7PhD entry cohort sizes are not related to the business cycle in our data (see appendix B.4).
8In effect, this assumption amounts to imposing that the business cycle at time of application has no
predictive power for the business cycle at graduation. We think that this is defendable as it takes on
average six years to complete a PhD and we show in Appendix B.4 that there is no correlation between
the business cycle at time of application and graduation in our data. In general, we expect that our
results should also hold in all of the cases where there is a reversal in the business cycle during that time
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can subsume this constant in the individual’s non-varying compensation component, the
academic skill level α.
Given these assumptions, an individual compares the expected compensation from
academia α + aỹt and business β + ỹt at time of application and at graduation. He
decides to apply for the academic sector (the PhD program or the assistant professorship)
whenever
α > β + yt. (2.1)
where t ∈ {app, grad} and yt ≡ (1 − a)ỹt. yt is the relative attractiveness of the business
sector that is due to the business cycle.9
2.2.2 Predictions
We are interested in how the selection of skills into academia and business varies with the
state of the business cycle. To ease the exposition, we compare a generic boom cohort
versus a generic recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. All proofs are relegated to Appendix
B.1.
Proposition 2.2.1 For PhD applicants, the joint distribution of academic and business
skills selected into the academic sector during a recession first order stochastically domi-
nates (FSD) the corresponding boom distribution.10
This proposition implies that the academic ability of the least able member of the boom
cohort, αBoom, is lower than the academic ability of the least able member of the recession
cohort, αRec.
frame, i.e., Pr(ỹBoomgrad |ỹRecapp ) > Pr(ỹBoomgrad |ỹBoomapp ) and Pr(ỹRecgrad|ỹBoomapp ) > Pr(ỹRecgrad|ỹRecapp ), and in a lot of
cases where there is sufficiently strong mean reversion.
9We could have added to the model that a PhD constitutes an investment into academic (and business)
skills. This is clearly an important feature of obtaining a graduate education and we did this in an earlier
version of this section. However, as long as the skill update and the uncertainty about it can be assumed
to be independent of the state of business cycle, it does not change the predictions of the model other than
by adding noise. Hence, we refrain from defining different (updated) αs, βs, and yts at PhD application
and graduation.
10On the flipside, this implies that the joint distribution of skills selected into business during a boom
first order stochastically dominates its recession counterpart. Note that in contrast to the well known
result of the general Roy model (e.g. see Heckman and Honoré 1990), we can make a definitive statement
about the stochastic dominance for a general distribution of skills here. This is due to the assumption of
binding quantity constraints and the resulting competitiveness of the admission into the academic sector.
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Figure 2.1 illustrates Proposition 2.2.1 when academic and business skills are distributed
uniformly in the unit interval. Given our assumptions, an individual’s career choice is
governed by a “one-shot” decision, with those individuals for whom α > β+yapp preferring
academia. During a boom (a high yBoomapp ), fewer individuals apply for academia than
during a recession (a low yRecapp ), which is depicted by a higher cutoff line for the former than
for the latter. Academic employers always hire a fixed number, N , of graduates (PhDs
& “only in boom” in boom, PhDs & “only in recession” in recessions) and therefore the
distribution of skills for the recession cohort lies to the “North-East” of the corresponding
distribution for the boom cohort. However, Proposition 2.2.2 shows that fewer of the
Figure 2.1: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at application
Note.—The “only in recession” area has the same size as the “only in boom” area because the same
number of applicants are admitted to the PhD in recessions and in booms.
PhDs who were admitted in a recession will remain in academia and become assistant
professors after the PhD.
Proposition 2.2.2 For every realization of the state of the economy at graduation ygrad,
a (weakly) higher fraction of the members of a “recession at time of application” cohort
will not remain in academia after the PhD.
The proposition implies that, on average, cohorts of PhD graduates more often leave
academia if they experienced a recession at the time of application. Figure 2.2 provides
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some intuition for the proposition. The academic skill cutoff, above which individuals will
prefer academic employment after the PhD, “on average” moves down to the dashed line
in the figure for a boom cohort and up for a recession cohort. Thus, in the figure, some
individuals of the recession cohort exit academia and enter business after the PhD when
the economy is out of recession, while everyone in the boom cohort stays in academia.
The recession graduates who leave academia here are the marginal ones who applied for
the PhD “because of” the recession in the first place.
Figure 2.2: Selection with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills at graduation
Note.—The “only in recession” area has the same size as the “only in boom” area because the same
number of applicants are admitted to the PhD in recessions and in booms.
Proposition 2.2.3 For any given realization of the business cycle at graduation ygrad,
the (partial) distribution of academic skills of the members of a “recession at application”
cohort who remain in academia after the PhD first order stochastically dominates the
distribution of skills of the corresponding members of the “boom at application” cohort.11
Proposition 2.2.3 implies that, no matter how many more recession students than boom
students leave academia after the PhD, the recession students who remain in academia
are still better in each quantile of their (academic) skill distribution. In our specific
11However, the stochastic dominance of the joint distribution of business and academic skills does not
feed through in general.
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example in Figure 2.2 we see that, although some mass of the recession cohort is cut off,
the recession distribution of skills in academia still lies to the “North-East” of the boom
distribution.
The effect of the business cycle at graduation (ygrad) is more straightforward. In a reces-
sion, relatively more graduates take up academic employment than in a boom. For these
graduates who end up in academia “because of” the business cycle the following equation
holds: β + yRecgrad < α ≤ β + yBoomgrad .
Proposition 2.2.4 restates this observation and Figure 2.3 provides a graphical represen-
tation in the special case of PhD graduates with academic and business skills distributed
uniformly in the unit square.
Proposition 2.2.4 A higher fraction of PhD economists decide to stay in the academic
sector if they experience a recession at graduation.
Figure 2.3: Selection at graduation
Finally, we can reformulate the three propositions of the model into empirical predictions
for our data. According to the state of the business cycle, (potential) economists will face
options in the academic and the business sector such that:
1. Fewer of the economists who experienced a recession at the time of application to
the PhD end up in academia (from Proposition 2.2.2).
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2. However, those who remain in academia are better researchers, both on average and
in each quantile of their publication distribution (from Proposition 2.2.3).
3. More of the economists who experienced a recession at graduation from the PhD
stay in academia (from Proposition 2.2.4),
4. and, therefore, recession PhD graduates publish more on average (also from Propo-
sition 2.2.4).12
2.3 Data
We have collected a new dataset of career choices and individual productivity for a large
sample of economists in the United States from 1955 to 2004. We aggregate the individuals
into university year cohorts and match these with measures of the business cycle in the
year of application and the year of graduation.13
2.3.1 Economist Sample Selection
The bases of our dataset are the names, graduation years and PhD granting institutions
of 13,624 economists who graduated from the top 30 US universities from 1955 to 1994.
This data is obtained from the American Economic Association’s (AEA) yearly “List of
Doctoral Dissertations in Economics”, which was published in the Papers and Proceedings
issue of the “American Economic Review” until 1986 and in the “Journal of Economic Lit-
erature” thereafter. We supplement this information with the tier of the degree granting
university according to the ranking of the National Research Council.14
12We assume that economists which enter the business sector do not publish at all. If more PhD
students stay in academic (i.e. if there is a recession at graduation) more of them have a positive
publication record. This effect increases — ceteris paribus — the average publication record per PhD
graduate.
13For the details of the data collection procedure, refer to Appendix B.2.
14The National Research Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into tiers.
The top three tiers include:
• Tier 1 (ranked 1–6): Chicago, Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Stanford, and Yale;
• Tier 2 (ranked 7–15): Columbia, Michigan, Minnesota, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Rochester,
California-Berkeley, California-Los Angeles, and Wisconsin-Madison;
• Tier 3 (ranked 16–30): Illinois-Urbana, Boston University, Brown, Cornell, Duke, Iowa, Maryland,
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2.3.2 Career Choice and Productivity Measures
We add an “academic” indicator which takes the value one if the economist was a faculty
member in a US economics, business or finance department in 2001 or listed as a member
of the American Economic Association, and otherwise zero. The US faculty directories are
compiled by James R. Hasselback and made available on his webpage.15 AEA Membership
data is obtained from the American Economic Association Directory of Members in 1970,
1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003 or 2007. AEA membership serves as a proxy for
faculty membership outside of the United States, because Hasselback’s faculty directories
strongly focus on US colleges and feature only very few foreign institutions.
In order to compare the oeuvres of different economists over time we calculate a consis-
tent measure of publication productivity. For all economists in our sample, we collect the
publication records in the first ten years after their graduation, multiply each publication
of an author by its weight (“publication points”) according to a dynamic journal ranking,
and divide it by the number of coauthors of the paper. We then sum up all these contri-
butions within the ten years after graduation to obtain a productivity measure for every
individual in our sample.
More specifically, we match the PhD graduates with their publications (including journal
title, number of pages and the number and identity of co-authors) in 74 journals listed in
JSTOR, a leading online archive of academic journals. We select all journals contained in
JSTOR for which a ranking was available. Thus we include all major publications in eco-
nomics and finance except the journals published by Elsevier, most notably the “Journal
of Monetary Economics” and the “Journal of Econometrics”.16 To ensure comparability
among researchers, we restrict our attention to the first ten years after graduation. JS-
TOR currently only provides full publication data up to the year 2004. With the ten year
requirement we can thus rightfully analyze the sample from 1955 to 1994 without placing
Michigan State, New York University, North Carolina, Texas-Austin, Virginia, California-San
Diego, University of Washington, and Washington University-St. Louis.
Source: “The American Economic Association Graduate Study in Economics Web Pages”, accessed 2011-
02-08, http://www.vanderbilt.edu/AEA/gradstudents/
15Source: “Faculty Directories”, James R. Hasselback, accessed 2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
16Because we do not believe that either recession or boom cohorts systematically prefer or dislike
Elsevier journals, this should be of no consequence.
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younger researchers at a disadvantage.
Comparing the value of the collected publication records for different researchers over
the decades is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has changed
substantially over time (Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Therefore, we construct a
dynamic journal ranking with decade specific publication points for each journal from
1950 onwards. For the period from 1960 to the 1989, we use the ranking from Laband and
Piette (1994), for the 1990s the equivalent ranking published in Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas,
and Stengos (2003), and for the 2000s the recursive discounted ranking available on the
“ideas” webpage.17 For the 1950s we were not able to find a journal ranking and thus
decided to extrapolate a ranking for articles published in the 1950s from our 1960s ranking.
A complete list of these journals with their associated publication points can be found in
Table B.2 of Appendix B.2.4.
In the Appendix B.6.1, we show that our results are robust to the use of other productivity
measures.
2.3.3 Macro Data and PhD Entry Date
The main aim of our study is to relate the career decisions and the publication success
of economists to a proxy for the state of the macroeconomy at the times of application
to and graduation from their PhD program. As our data contains only person-specific
graduation dates, we infer the application date by subtracting the median duration of a
PhD of 6 years from the graduation date.18
This is a potential problem because the variation in completion times across PhDs is sub-
stantial. Section B.2.5 in the appendix reruns our main regressions using the distribution
of completion times for the 1997 graduating cohort. The results become stronger, which
suggests that measurement error in the business cycle at application potentially biases
our estimates in the main part of our analysis.
17Refer to “IDEAS/RePEc Recursive Discounted Impact Factors for Journals”, last accessed 2009-07-
31, http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, however, that the ranking
on the website is updated continuously and thus is not exactly the same as we use in this study. The
ranking that we use here was downloaded on 2009-07-31.
18The median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant at from five to six years since the 1970s (see
Table B.3 in Appendix B.2.5).
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Our prefered proxy for the state of the business cycle is the change in the rate of un-
employment from June of the preceding year to June of the considered year. The Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) recession indicators are arguably the most
convincing measures of recessions. However, binary indicators cannot carry information
about the state of the economy as fine as continuous measures. Unemployment change
is such a continuous measure and—out of several candidate variables that are available
for the whole of our sample period—it is the most strongly correlated with the NBER
recession indicators. For example Figure 2.4 shows that recessions go hand in hand with
a large change in unemployment. Unemployment levels are high only after a recession.
To demonstrate the robustness of our conclusions, we also estimate all our specifications
using unemployment levels and GDP growth as explanatory variables.
Figure 2.4: Unemployment and recessions
We refrain from using some more business sector- or economist-specific measures of the
state of the business cycle because they are generally not available for the entire study
period. For example, Job Openings for Economists (JOE), a listing of open positions for
economists published by the American Economic Assocation, is only available from 1976
onwards. Since our study period ends in 1994, using the JOE listings would reduce the
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length of our time series to 18 data points (minus six if we used job openings at application
to the PhD as well).19
2.3.4 Aggregation to University-Year Level
Finally, we group our graduates’ publication performances and the indicator for being an
academic or not into university-graduation year averages. Thus, we reduce the number
of our observations from 13,624 individuals who graduated from institutions in tiers one,
two, and three between 1955 to 1994, to 1068 cohort means. Because we do not use any
explanatory or control variables that vary below the university-year level, this grouping
entails no loss of information.
2.3.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.1 provides summary statistics for the PhD cohorts’ average productivity, the
average probability to become an academic, and the macroeconomic variation.
The average ten-year productivity of a university-year cohort is about 31.49 publication
points. The average probability to become an academic is about 60% and is slightly
falling over time as we can see in Figure 2.5a. Conditioned on being an academic, the
average ten-year cohort productivity totals 48.14 publication points. This is about 50%
of an article in the AER in the 1990s.20
Figure 2.5b depicts the average productivity of the PhD cohorts for every year in our
analysis, distinguishing between the average productivity of all graduates and graduates
that became an academic. As expected, we see that the performance measures move
together to a substantial degree.
19Nevertheless, in appendix B.3 we can show that job openings and our macroeconomic indicators are
correlated using the whole time period from 1976 to 2010. We also want to thank Paul Oyer for sharing
his data on financial services activity.
20In order to translate these publication points in terms of articles in a certain journal, one has to take
into account that the importance of journals changes over time. For example, an article in the American
Economic Review (AER) in the 1990s was worth 100 publication points while it was “only” worth 40.2
points in the 1980s. Therefore, the average ten-year productivity of a member of a university-year cohort
in the full sample is about the equivalent of one-third of an AER article in the 1990s. Refer to Appendix
B.2.4 for a more detailed interpretation.
44
The Allocation of Talent: Evidence from the Market of Economists
The change in the unemployment rate, our preferred independent variable, has a mean
value of approximately zero. The 10% quantile is -0.9 percentage points and the 90%
quantile is 1.5 percentage points for the change in the rate of unemployment. The average
unemployment level is 6.1 % and the average GDP growth is 3.4 %. From the 1955 to 1994
the US was in recession 17% of all years. As an example, Figure 2.5c plots the change in
the unemployment rate and the GDP growth together with indicator for recessions from
1955 to 1994.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics
mean sd min max p10 p90
Productivity 31.49 84.89 0.00 1738.10 0.00 93.80
Productivity (Academic) 48.14 103.84 0.00 1738.10 0.00 144.72
Academic 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Unempl Change 0.02 1.03 -2.10 2.90 -0.90 1.50
Unemployment 6.11 1.50 3.50 9.70 3.80 7.70
GDP Growth 3.38 2.29 -1.94 7.20 -0.23 6.42
Recession 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Observations 13624
2.4 Results
In this section we examine the empirical predictions derived from the modified Roy model.
To do this, we estimate the following model in three different specifications:
qi,t = β · yapp,t + γ · ygrad,t + δ · controls + εi,t (2.2)
In the first specification, the outcome variable qi,t is the average publication output of
a cohort of graduates from university i in year t. In the second specification, it is the
average propensity to decide in favor of an academic career after the PhD, and in the
third specification, qi,t is the average productivity of those who have decided to stay in
academia after the PhD. The unit of observation in all three cases is the average of a given
university in a given year, weighted by the amount of underlying individual observations.
Moreover, the standard errors are clustered on the graduation year level, in order to
allow for contemporaneous correlation between the outcome variables in the presence of
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Figure 2.5: Dependent and independent variables over time
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regressors that do not vary within a given year.
The regressors yapp,t and ygrad,t are a measure of the business cycle at application and at
graduation for each cohort. Our preferred regressor is the change in the unemployment
rate. To show the robustness of our results we also estimate all specifications with unem-
ployment levels, GDP growth and NBER recession indicators as measures of the business
cycle. For conciseness, we focus our interpretation on the effect of unemployment change
on our dependent variables and only highlight if differences arise from using one of the
other measures. As control variables, we include dummies for the full set of interactions
of university and graduation decade. These dummies pick up the (changing) quality dif-
ferences of PhD education among universities over time and they control for the higher
standards of publication in recent decades (e.g. Ellison 2002a, Ellison 2002b).
We estimate Equation (2.2) using linear regressions. To identify the average treatment
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effect of the business cycle measure on the respective outcome variable, we assume that
the productivity and the career decisions of a cohort of (potential) PhD economists do not
contemporaneously affect the business cycle in a given year. This assumption excludes
potential reverse causality.21 To be able to interpret β and γ exclusively as the causal
parameters of the selection effect discussed in the theory section, we need an additional
exclusion restriction to be satisfied: we assume that unemployment change affects a co-
hort’s career decisions and publications only in terms of changing their choice of the sector
to apply to (the selection effect). This assumption might not strictly be true in the light
of the result of Oyer (2006) that the state of the business cycle affects an economist’s first
job placement and thus his productivity. We explain in Section 2.4.3 that given Oyer’s
result we might actually underestimate the causal effect of selection in our regressions due
to leaving out the quality of the first job.
Table 2.2 summarizes the main regression results of the three specifications, each in one
column. Every column contains four independent regressions each using another business
cycle measure for the two explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients of the different
regressions are reported one below the other. The following subsections explain the results
for the three outcome variables in turn.
2.4.1 Effect on the Publications of all PhDs
The first column of Table 2.2 shows the effect of the business cycle on the publication
output of an average PhD graduate in the sample. Unemployment change, both at time of
application and at graduation, has a significantly positive effect on research productivity
at the five and one percent level, respectively. These two results are also economically
substantial: a cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at time of application
is expected to achieve 3.7 publication points more than a cohort on the 10% quantile.
This is approximately 12% of the mean. Similarly, if we do the same calculation for the
graduation cohort, the difference is 5.5 points, which is 17.6% of the mean.22
21Furthermore, no third factor is allowed to influence both—the business cycle and, the career decisions
and productivity—directly.
22Referring to Table 2.1 above, the difference between the 10% and the 90% quantiles of unemployment
change at time of application is 2.4. Multiplying this by the parameter estimate of 1.54 gives a difference
in average productivity between “boom” and “recession” cohorts of 3.7 publication points. Referring to
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Table 2.2: The main regression results
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 1.54∗∗ -0.89 3.27∗∗∗
(0.66) (0.58) (0.94)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.31∗∗∗ 1.35∗∗ 2.74∗∗
(0.65) (0.61) (1.20)
Unemployment (Application) 1.58∗∗ -0.75 2.98∗∗
(0.65) (0.79) (1.10)
Unemployment (Graduation) 1.80∗∗ -0.25 3.08∗∗
(0.73) (0.59) (1.26)
GDP Growth (Application) -0.66∗∗ 0.47∗ -1.46∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.24) (0.42)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.71∗∗ -0.41 -0.74
(0.33) (0.27) (0.56)
Recession (Application) 2.16 -3.24∗∗ 5.38∗
(2.11) (1.55) (2.93)
Recession (Graduation) 4.56∗∗ 2.15 5.09
(2.14) (1.29) (3.57)
Subsample All All Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1047
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
48
The Allocation of Talent: Evidence from the Market of Economists
Using the alternative measures of the business cycle as regressors deliver qualitatively
similar results as unemployment change. A higher unemployment rate is associated with
higher productivity at application and at exit. Positive GDP growth leads to a lower
publication productivity and NBER recessions go hand in hand in hand with more pub-
lication success. All coefficients are statistically different from zero at least at the five
percent level. The only exception is the estimated coefficient for NBER recessions at
application which is not significant at conventional levels.
Therefore, the effect of the business cycle at graduation is in line with empirical prediction
4: PhDs who graduate during a recession publish more on average because more of them
decide to stay in academia. Thus, the theoretical effect is at the “extensive margin” as
opposed to an “intensive margin” effect in which those PhDs who would have stayed in
academia anyway are publishing more if they graduate in recession than if they graduate
in a boom.
The theory does not make a prediction which overall effect the business cycle at time of
application should have on the publication output of an average PhD graduate. On the
one hand, according to Proposition 2.2.1, graduates who experienced a recession at time
of application constitute a better selection of individuals. On the other hand, according
to Proposition 2.2.2, fewer of these individuals are expected to stay in academia and
publish after the PhD. Empirically, it seems that the former effect dominates the latter,
as a worse business cycle (measured by a large positive change in the unemployment rate,
a higher unemployment rate or lower GDP growth) at time of application is associated
with a higher publication output of an average PhD.
2.4.2 Effect on Career Decisions
The second column of Table 2.2 reports how the business cycle is related to economists’
career decisions after the PhD. PhD graduates are more likely to stay in academia when
the economy is ailing according to our preferred business cycle measure of unemployment
Table B.2 in Appendix B.2.4, this is about the number of publication points one gets assigned for an
article in “Economica” during the 1990s. From Table 2.1, we also find that the “average” PhD graduate
achieves 31.49 publication points. Similarly, multiplying the difference between the 90% and 10% quantile
of unemployment change with the paramter estimate of 2.31 at graduation yields 5.549 publication points.
This is about 17.6% of the mean of 31.49.
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change at graduation. The estimated coefficient is significant at the five percent level.
The mean estimates point in the same direction for two of the three alternative measures,
but they are not significantly different from zero on conventional levels.
These findings give qualified support for empirical prediction 3 from the theory section:
PhD graduates are more likely to stay in academia if there is a recession at graduation.
The increased average productivity of a recession cohort might therefore come from this
“extensive margin” effect. Taking the mean estimates for unemployment change literally, a
member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at graduation (+1.5%)
has a 3.24 percentage points higher probability to become an academic compared to a
PhD student graduating on the 10% quantile (-0.9%). The average propensity to become
an academic is 60%.
The theory also predicts that economists who experience a recession at application to the
PhD are less likely to stay in academia afterwards because some of them will enter only
because of the recession (prediction 1). The evidence in Table 2.2 suggests the existence of
this effect. The estimated coefficient for unemployment change is of the predicted sign but
not statistically different from zero. Also the parameter estimates of all other measures
are of the predicted sign. For GDP growth and recession indicators they are significantly
different from zero at the ten and the five percent level, respectively.
More generally, there are three different concepts conceivable of someone being an “aca-
demic”: First, one could only consider faculty members of higher learning institutions as
academics. This definition leaves out staff at international organizations, central banks
and other research-focused (governmental) institutions. Second, one could argue that the
relevant distinguishing characteristic of an academic is producing novel and original re-
search. And finally, one could more generally consider anyone an academic who works on
research-related topics and upholds a relationship with the academic community.
The evidence reported in Table 2.2 is based on the third notion of an academic by clas-
sifying anyone as such who is either a faculty member or a member of the American
Economic Association (AEA) after the PhD. Table 2.3 additionally reports the measures
of being an academic according to the first two notions.
Column two in this table shows the propensity to become an academic measured by
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Table 2.3: Different measures for being classified as an academic
Academic Faculty Publish Academic
Unempl Change (Application) -0.89 -0.43 -0.98∗∗ -1.72∗∗∗
(0.58) (0.47) (0.46) (0.58)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 1.35∗∗ 0.54 0.41 2.87∗∗∗
(0.61) (0.41) (0.40) (0.94)
Unemployment (Application) -0.75 0.08 0.10 -1.23
(0.79) (0.38) (0.42) (1.03)
Unemployment (Graduation) -0.25 0.60 0.03 -0.08
(0.59) (0.36) (0.40) (0.92)
GDP Growth (Application) 0.47∗ 0.25 0.45∗∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.29)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.41 -0.05 0.05 -1.25∗∗∗
(0.27) (0.19) (0.23) (0.36)
Recession (Application) -3.24∗∗ -1.42 -1.79 -5.73∗∗∗
(1.55) (1.06) (1.20) (1.73)
Recession (Graduation) 2.15 1.84∗∗ 1.14 3.95∗∗
(1.29) (0.76) (0.84) (1.67)
Subsample All All All Tier 1
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1068 1068 1068 234
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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whether graduates end up as members of faculty at an economics, business or finance de-
partment of a college or university in the United States according to the listings published
by Hasselback (2001). The direction of the effect is the same as in column one and in the
main results table except for unemployment levels. However, the resulting coefficients are
not statistically significant for either point in time. The only exception is the estimated
coefficient for for recession indicators at graduation from the PhD, which is significant at
the five percent level. This might be the case because the employed faculty listings are
not exhaustive. For example, faculty on leave are not included and we do not have faculty
directories for other departments, such as law and agriculture. Furthermore, our faculty
listings are strongly focused on US institutions. Thus, they miss many foreign gradu-
ates who become professors in their home countries and are members of the American
Economic Association.
Column three defines an academic as an individual who, according to our data, publishes
at least one article in a ranked scientific journal after his or her PhD. The estimated
effect for the business cycle at application points in the predicted direction for three out
of four measures. The estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero on the
five percent level for unemployment change and for GDP growth. The business cycle at
graduation is weak and not significant for any of the independent variables.23
Column 4 in Table 2.3 also shows regressions for the propensity to become an academic
(according to our preferred academic measure) for a subsample of graduates from the six
top-ranked universities, i.e. the tier one schools. The effect here is significant at least on
the five percent level and in the predicted direction for three out of the four business cycle
measures. We interpret this as evidence that it is actually the individuals at the very top
of the skill distribution which are most able to successfully switch back and forth between
academia and business and who thus possess what one could call general skills. Overall,
we conclude that the results at lend support to the predictions made by our theory about
23This seems to confirm the different reasons for becoming an academic in relation to the two points
in time: on the one hand, those individuals who become an academic because the economy is bad at
graduation are just added at the extensive margin and some of them might not be able to write a ranked
article. On the other hand, those individuals who experienced a recession at time of application and
decide against academia after the PhD are of high academic ability according to the theory. Thus, a
larger share of them would have been able to write a ranked article had they stayed in academia.
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the career decisions of PhD graduates.24
2.4.3 Effect on the Publications of Academics
The last column of Table 2.2 shows the results of regressing the publication output of
individuals classified as academics on our four business cycle measures. The results here
are largely robust to the sample selection according to any of the three definitions of an
academic that were discussed above (see Table B.11 in Appendix B.6.3).
For all the different measures, the productivity of academics who experienced a recession
at time of application is significantly higher than that of academics who applied during
a boom. This is in line with prediction 2 which states that the selection of PhD entrants
is better during economically difficult times and that this better selection persists to the
PhD graduates who stay in academia. The coefficient is significant at the one percent
level for unemployment change and of economically relevant magnitude: comparing the
average member of the cohort on the 90% quantile of unemployment change at time of
application to a cohort member on the 10% quantile, the former is on average 10.47
publication points better than the latter. This is about 16% of the mean.25
In fact, prediction 2 states that a generic recession at time of application cohort should first
order stochastically dominate a generic boom at time of application cohort with respect
to academic skill. Therefore, not only the mean but the whole distribution of academic
skills should shift to the right if the economy worsens. Table 2.4 shows the effect of the
24One concern that was expressed to us is that foreign students may go back to their home country
after the PhD. For example, Borjas (2006) shows that the share of foreign doctoral students has more
than doubled since the 1970s. If hiring in the academic sector in the US is cyclical too, one might imagine
that, in recessions, more foreign students go back to academic jobs in their respective home countries. We
do not have information about whether students are natives or foreigners in our dataset. In terms of our
model, if there are foreign academic programs whose hiring is less correlated with the US business cycle
than US schools’ hiring, this makes demand for economists more inelastic. If those graduates who take
the option to go back more often in recessions appear in the faculty listings, the AEA listings, or if they
publish in ranked journals, they are counted as academics. This fits our story. If they are not counted
as academics, our estimates in Table 2.2 will understate the effect of the business cycle at graduation on
the propensity to become an academic and, depending on whether it is the high-α or the low-α PhDs
who react more to this, our estimates will under- or overstate the effect on the publications per graduate.
Note that our model does not make predictions on the latter effect.
25The 10% quantile of unemployment change at time of application is -0.9 percentage points, the 90%
quantile is 1.5 percentage points and the difference is therefore 2.4 percentage points. Multiplying this
difference with the mean estimate of 3.27 yields 7.86. The mean productivity for an academic is 48.14
publication points.
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business cycle on the distribution of publication output within each cohort using quantile
regressions. The unit of observation is now an individual academic’s publication output.26
Among those PhDs who are considered academics according to our “academic” measure,
45 percent do not publish at all. We therefore restrict Table 2.4 to the effect of the
business cycle on the median of the publication distribution and above.
The estimates are in the predicted direction and significant for the upper quantiles of
the publication distribution, but they become less significant for the lower quantiles.
The reason for this is probably that the “academic” measure is not perfect at separating
academics who do not publish from individuals who have left academia after the PhD. We
know that there are more such individuals among the recession at application cohort, some
of which are thus mistaken as low-skill academics. This downward-biases the difference
between the publication distributions, most strongly so at the lower quantiles.27
Table 2.2 also reports the effect of the business cycle at graduation on the research pro-
ductivity of academics. According to the evidence in section 2.4.2 more PhDs decide for
an academic career if there is a recession at graduation. Without a specific assumption
on the distribution of skills of PhD economists, our theory does not make a prediction
whether the additional academics who enter at the “extensive margin” are of higher or
lower academic skill than the average of those graduates who always decide to stay in
academia after the PhD.
The empirical results in Table 2.2 suggest that on average PhD students with higher
academic ability decide to stay in academia if the economy is in a state of recession
compared to a state of boom. This is in line with the result already noted in Section
2.4.2, that it seems to be the individuals at the top of the skill distribution who are able
to successfully move between the sectors. The estimated coefficients are significant at
the five percent level for unemployment changes and levels. They are not significant but
26We only control for university tier–graduation decade fixed effects and their interactions here, because
the quantile estimation becomes much less reliable with a large number of dummy controls. The standard
errors are not clustered on the graduation year level as this is not straightforward to implement with
quantile regressions.
27If we define an academic according to whether he publishes in a ranked journal instead of AEA
membership or appearance in a faculty listing, and thus condition on non-zero publications, our quantile
regressions yield positive and significant effects of unemployment change in line with the theory over the
whole publication distribution.
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Table 2.4: Quantile regression for the academic subsamples
50% 65% 80% 95%
Unempl Change (Application) -0.00∗∗∗ 0.45 3.70∗∗∗ 9.34∗
(0.00) (0.67) (1.30) (5.02)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 0.00∗∗∗ 1.13 3.87∗∗∗ 0.62
(0.00) (0.71) (1.34) (5.22)
Unemployment (Application) -0.00∗∗∗ 0.79∗ 3.89∗∗ 11.22∗∗
(0.00) (0.45) (1.69) (5.29)
Unemployment (Graduation) 0.00∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 5.19∗∗∗ 11.58∗∗
(0.00) (0.41) (1.54) (4.56)
GDP Growth (Application) 0.00∗∗∗ -0.39 -1.59∗∗ -4.81∗∗
(0.00) (0.26) (0.66) (2.28)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.00∗∗∗ -0.04 -1.08 2.11
(0.00) (0.27) (0.68) (2.28)
Recession (Application) -0.00 1.10 6.91 17.51
(0.01) (1.99) (4.29) (14.01)
Recession (Graduation) 0.00 4.88∗∗ 8.00∗ 1.00
(0.01) (1.95) (4.24) (13.87)
Subsample Academic Academic Academic Academic
Tier-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8222 8222 8222 8222
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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in the right direction for GDP growth and the recession indicators. According to our
estimates, an academic graduating on the 90% quantile of unemployment change is on
average 6.67 publication points better than an academic graduating on the 10% quantile.
This is about 13% of the mean of 48.14.
At first glance, the result that academics who experience a recession at graduation are
more successful at publishing than those who experience a boom, seems to contradict
the findings by Paul Oyer (2006). He shows that PhDs who graduate during a favorable
academic job market (which is correlated with economically good times in general) obtain
better initial academic placements. He further shows that the first placement has a posi-
tive causal effect on an economist’s research output by instrumenting the first placement
with the state of the academic job market during the graduation year.
However, we think that Oyer’s and our result may not be contradictory, but that they
could actually reinforce each other: suppose that both effects are relevant in reality—
Oyer’s placement effect and our selection effect. On the one hand, we would underestimate
the effect of the business cycle at graduation on the skills selected into academia. This
is because we would not take into account the worse placement a recession economist
experiences on average, which would lower our measure of his skill, the publication output.
Thus, the individuals selected into academia in recession would actually be better in terms
of ex-ante skill than our estimate indicates. On the other hand, Oyer would underestimate
the causal effect of the first placement on the research output of an economist. This is
because he would not take into account the lower average ex-ante skill of a given economist
during boom due to selection.
Finally, it was suggested to us that our results could (partly) be driven by individuals
timing their graduation or dropping out of the PhD program at different rates due to
recessions. Conceptually, these alternative explanations can be understood as variants
of our selection story. Appendix B.4 discusses the alternative explanations and their
implications and provides evidence which suggests that they are not important in our
data.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the effect of aggregate labor market conditions on the career
choices and research productivity of economics PhDs in the United States. We document
that individuals who applied for—and graduated from—PhD programs during a recession
produce substantially more research. Moreover, our results on the economists’ career
decisions provide evidence that the productivity effects arise from a selection into sectors
driven by the state of the economy.
We concede that the market for academic economists is a very particular labor market.
Yet, it is uniquely suited for our study because it provides a good output-based measure
of skill. Our model is designed to capture key features of this market and it is not
necessarily meant to apply broadly. Nevertheless, if (potential) economists react similarly
to incentives as talented individuals in other knowledge-intensive occupations, we may be
able to draw conclusions for other segments of the labor market from our study.
Our model features talent selection with and without quantity constraints. Selection
without quantity constraints appears to be the norm in the private sector and has received
a lot of attention in the literature. Without imposing further assumptions on the skill
distribution, the only general prediction we can deduct from these models is that more
individuals will enter the sector that becomes relatively more attractive (Heckman and
Honoré 1990).
Quantity constraints, in the sense that the number of new hires is fixed, are probably
more important in the public than in the private sector. Entry is competitive for the
top jobs in civil service and therefore clear predictions about the composition of talent
arise. For other occupations in the public sector—like teachers and nurses—this does not
appear to be the case. In the private sector, the predictions about talent composition
are unambiguous if we consider the average skill level of the top N employees only. For
example, we expect that the top 100 new hires in the consulting industry to be a better
selection of talent if the relative compensation in this occupation rises.
The other specific feature of our setting is its two step selection process with competitive
admission and the academic versus non-academic career choice six years later. This
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is quite unique. However, early careers in other knowledge-intensive industries are not
completely dissimilar: for example, starting positions in law or consulting firms feature
an informal training phase with a performance appraisal and promotion decision at the
end. In many cases the employee decides to leave the industry afterwards.
Overall, we conclude that there are some important specificities in our setting that might
impede a broad external validity of our findings. Nevertheless, our key general question
of interest is whether there are talent allocation effects in labor markets in response to
shocks. Despite all mentioned specificities, the answer to this question is more likely to
be yes with the results of our study.
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Taxes on Venture
Capital Investment
3.1 Introduction
Around the world, governments introduce policies to promote venture capital and thus
venture capital-financed start-up companies.1 These companies are of special interest for
the policy maker, because they are particularly innovative: for example, a dollar spent
on venture capital yielded more than twice as many patents than a dollar spent on R&D
by established companies in the United States in the period from 1983 to 1992 (Kortum
and Lerner 2000).2 Despite this public interest, it is not completely understood how
public policy influences the investment behavior of venture capital investors and thus the
entrepreneurial process. In particular, high taxes are supposed to discourage investment
from a theoretical perspective, but — to the best of our knowledge — there is no empirical
estimate of the size of this effect.3 Our study contributes to closing this gap.
To estimate the effect of taxes on venture capital investment, we match all recorded in-
vestments in the Thomson One database with tax rates in 24 countries from 2000 to 2009.
1See for example Lerner (2009), Cumming (2010), Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2010), and
DeGennaro (2010)
2Furthermore, the likelihood of a new product being introduced in the market is three times higher if
a start-up receives venture capital (Hellmann and Puri 2000).
3There is however a large literature on the effect of taxes on the size of the venture capital industry
and the amount of capital commited.
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We thus obtain an unbalanced panel of 17,008 companies in 24 different countries with
a total of 31,905 funding rounds. The two taxes under consideration are the individual
capital gains tax and the overall tax on dividend income. The latter combines the corpo-
rate income tax for small and medium-sized companies and the personal income tax on
dividend income. We expect both tax rates to have a negative impact on the incentive to
invest: the capital gains tax, which is levied on a company’s sales price when the investor
sells her shares, reduces his return from a potential exit. Similiarly, the overall dividend
tax levied on corporate profits and dividends reduces the value of the investee company
to the buyer and thus the sales price of an inital public offering (IPO) or a trade sale.
In the first part of our analysis, we measure the effect of these taxes on the number of firms
receiving their first funding by venture capitalists. We use a negative binomial model to
explain the number of new ventures with the two tax rates, year- and country fixed-effects.
Our results indicate that an increase in the overall dividend tax rate has a negative effect
on the number of companies receiving their first investment. The estimated coefficient
is significantly different from zero at the one percent level and economically large: a one
percentage point increase in the dividend tax rate is associated with approximately two
percent fewer companies funded. At a mean of 131 new companies per country and year,
such a tax increase leads to a reduction of about two newly-funded ventures. The mean
estimate of the capital gains tax is also negative, but not significantly different from zero
at conventional levels.
In the second part of our analysis, we consider the influence of taxes on the probability
of venture capital-backed firms receiving a follow-up investment. As empirical model we
use a firm fixed-effects panel with the probability of investment as the dependent and the
two tax rates as the independent variables. We find that on average an increase in the
capital gains tax rate of one percentage point reduces the probability of venture capital-
backed companies receiving a follow-up investment by two percentage points. At a mean
probability of investment of 59% in our sample, such a tax increase reduces the likelihood
of investment by around four percent relative to the mean. The estimated coefficient of
the capital gains tax is significantly different from zero at the one percent level. The mean
estimate of the overall dividend tax is negative, but not significantly different from zero
at conventional levels.
60
The Effect of Taxes on Venture Capital Investment
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which analyzes the effect of taxes on
the probability of investment in venture capital backed companies. In particular, we are
the first to explicitly consider the effect of taxes on the start-up’s probability of receiving
a follow-up funding. Thus, we are able to trace the influence of taxes over the whole
investment cycle from inception to the exit of the venture capitalist.4 Furthermore, the
employed method of a firm fixed-effects panel regression has not been applied to study
venture capital backed companies before. This is an improvement on prior work as we can
better control for firm-specific heterogeneity compared to previous studies using country
fixed-effects. Our study newly assesses the effectiveness of taxes on the creation and the
probability of continuing financial support for venture capital-backed companies. It can
therefore deliver recommendations for policy-makers on how to enhance the success of
new ventures.
The idea of considering the effect of macroeconomic and industry conditions on the invest-
ment probability in the first funding round is not new. It was first applied by Gompers,
Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008). They study the effect of the market-to-book ratio
on a venture capital fund’s number of investments in newly created companies in a given
industry. In contrast to their work, we analyze the effects of tax policy on venture capital-
ists’ investment decisions throughout the investment cycle. Brander, Du, and Hellmann
(2010) use the same dataset as we do and analyze the influence of government supported
venture capitalists on the probability of venture capital funds realizing a successful exit
with their portfolio companies.
Several other studies have considered the effect of taxes on the volume of venture capital
committed in a certain country and year (e.g. Poterba 1987, Poterba 1989, Gompers,
Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998, Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 2006, Bonini and
Alkan 2009). They all find a negative impact of taxes on the supply of risk capital.
By considering only tax-exempt investors, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann (1998)
even show a negative effect on the demand for venture capital. Our study adds to their
findings as we analyze the investment decision of the venture capitalists explicitly, and
not the overall volume invested by a venture capital fund or in a country. This allows us
4Townsend (2010) estimates the effect of the burst of the tech-bubble on the chance of obtaining
a follow-up investment. Bergemann, Hege, and Peng (2009) treat the size and frequency of follow-up
funding as the outcome of a learning process.
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to evaluate the effect of taxes on the survival of start-ups, which cannot be determined
by looking at investment volumes alone.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section explains the
institutional set-up and the proposed causal channel of taxes on investment activity. In
Section 3.3 we discuss our data construction. The empirical specification and the results
can be found in Section 3.4. In Section 3.5, we conduct robustness checks on our results
and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
Venture capital (VC) funds are often the only source of funding for young high-risk
companies (Elango, Fried, Hisrich, and Polonchek 1995, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and
Hellmann 1998).5 For such start-up companies, traditional bank financing is unavailable,
because they do not have assets which can pledged as collateral. Instead of demanding
collateral, a venture capital fund monitors start-ups intensively after the investment, so
that the risk of exploitation of private benefits is reduced (Becker and Hellmann 2003, Ka-
plan and Strömberg 2004, Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann 1998). Usually, venture
capitalists carefully structure their investments, take seats on the board of directors and
concentrated equity positions to obtain control rights (Tirole 2006). To further improve
their bargaining position in the monitoring process, they do not invest the required funds
all at once but in consecutive funding rounds. In our data, companies receive on average
1.81 funding rounds.
The investment in a start-up is profitable if the investor is eventually able to sell the
acquired share of the company to the public in an initial public offering (IPO) or to an
established company in a trade sale. Cochrane (2005) estimates that if a firm is acquired
or taken public, it delivers to the investor an arithmetic return of 698% with a standard
deviation (std) of 3,282%. The average return of all venture capital investments is about
59%, with a standard deviation of 107%. In the first round the average return from
investing is 72% (122% std) and decreases to 46% (97% std) in the fourth round mirroring
5We use ventures, start-ups, and companies interchangeably throughout the chapter.
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the lower risk of investing in later rounds. As an IPO is the most profitable exit route,
an active stock exchange is an important determinant of venture capital investment.(Jeng
and Wells 2000, Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 2006, Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and
Scharfstein 2008)
In our analysis we consider the investment decisions of a representative venture capitalist
who aims to achieve a guaranteed minimum return on her investment, the so-called hurdle
rate.6 The venture capitalist closes a funding round for the venture if his expected gains
from the investment, i.e. the expected sales price net of taxes less the expected costs
associated with the investment, are larger than or equal to his required return.7 Thus,
the probability of venture capitalists providing funding to young companies rises if tax
policy is designed in such a way that the venture capitalists’ potential returns are high.
We analyze the effect of two tax rates - the capital gains tax and the overall tax rate
on dividend income. Each tax influences the net present value of investing through a
different channel: the capital gains tax rate is levied on the difference between the sales
price and the amount invested. This directly reduces the investor’s return and thus the
VC’s incentive to invest in, to support, and to monitor the venture (Keuschnigg and
Nielsen 2004a). Therefore, higher capital gains taxes should reduce the number of start-
ups that receive venture capital financing (Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2001, Keuschnigg
and Nielsen 2005, Becker and Hellmann 2003) and the probability that entrepreneurial
companies’ receiving subsequent funding rounds (Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004a).
The overall tax burden on dividend income is capitalized in the sales price, and thus
reduces the potential return for the investor. The value of the company to the potential
purchaser, i.e. the maximum sales price, is the net present value of its dividend payments.
Dividend payments are taxed by the personal income tax on dividend income (DT) at
the investor’s level and paid out of net profits. These profits accrue from corporate
profits earned in the market, net of the corporate income tax (CIT). Thus both, higher
corporate and personal income tax rates diminish the yearly dividend payments and the
value which can be realized in the event of an exit (Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and Hellmann
6This minimum return is among others influenced by the risk-free return rate and the capital gains
tax rate that would have to be paid on the return.
7Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) use a similar thought model for venture capital to explain innovation
waves.
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1998, Keuschnigg and Nielsen 2004b, Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 2006, Bonini and
Alkan 2009). Taken together, an increase in the overall tax rate on dividend income should
reduce the number of companies receiving their first investment, and the probability of
receiving a follow up investment by a venture capital- backed company.
Previous studies have used the investment volumes of venture capital as the dependent
variable for analyzing tax policy, implicitly focusing on the incentive of the VC to do
fundraising and the limited partners to provide funds (Gompers, Lerner, Blair, and
Hellmann 1998, Jeng and Wells 2000, Bonini and Alkan 2009). This makes sense as
the raising of funds is a prerequisite for venture capital investments. However, size alone
is not a satisfactory measure of the contribution of venture capital markets to the fi-
nancing of new companies, as no direct conclusion can be drawn on how many firms are
created, or whether they persist in the market (Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli 2006).
In our study we focus on the net effect of taxes on the number of newly VC financed
ventures and their survival probability, no matter whether this is associated with more or
less capital committed.
3.3 Data and Variable Construction
For our dataset we collect tax data for 24 countries over 10 years. We match this data with
venture capital investments in these countries in the same period. Data on the individual
capital gains tax rate in each year and country is obtained from Ernst & Young “Global
Executive” tax guides and the tax handbooks published by the International Bureau of
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD). In order to calculate the overall tax on dividend income,
we combine the corporate income tax rate and the net personal tax rate on dividend
income from the OECD tax database. We collect the data on venture capital investment
from Thomson One database (formerly known as VentureXpert) published by Thomson
Reuters. The source of each variable is described in Table 3.1.
The individual (instead of the corporate) capital gains tax rate is used in our study
because usually “transparent” taxation is applied to capital gains.8 This means that the
8The applicable individual capital gains tax rate is determined for an investor who holds a substantial
stake in a company and does not sell her shares for a specific time period, for which usually long-term
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Table 3.1: Data description
Variable Description Source
Capital Gains Tax Top capital gains tax rate appli-
cable to individuals in the high-
est income bracket.
Ernst & Young Global Executive
Tax guides and tax handbooks
published by the International
Bureau of Fiscal Documentation.
Net personal dividend tax
(DT)
Net top personal tax on dividend
income to be paid on shareholder
level, taking account of all types
of tax relief and gross-up provi-
sions at the shareholder level.
OECD Tax Database avail-
able at http://www.oecd.
org/document/60/0,3343,en_
2649_34533_1942460_1_1_1_
37427,00.html last accessed
on May, 12th 2011. The net
personal income tax is taken
from table II.4.
Corporate Income Tax
(CIT)
Basic combined (central and sub-
central statutory) corporate in-
come tax rate for small and
medium-size companies.
OECD Tax Database. The gen-
eral corporate income tax rate
can be found in Table II.1 and
is substituted by the rate for
small and medium-size enter-
prises from Table II.2 where ap-
plicable.
ODT rate The overall tax rate on dividend
income combining the corporate
income tax rate for small and
medium-size enterprises and the
net personal tax rate on dividend
income. ODT rate= 1 − (1 −
CIT ) · (1 − DT )
OECD Tax Database. The cal-
culation of the ODT rate is the
same as the “Overall Dividend
Tax rate” in table II.4.
# Firms Count of the number of firms
receiving the first VC funding
round.
Thomson One-Private Equity
Module (formerly: VentureX-
pert).
Investment Dummy variable, equal to 1 if
the company obtains a follow up
round or is exited successfully.
A successful exit is defined by a
trade sale or the company going
public.
Thomson One-Private Equity
Module (formerly: VentureX-
pert).
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venture capitalists’ capital gains are taxed on the individual level even if they execute
their investments via funds. The individual capital gains tax rates are taken from the
European tax handbooks of the IBFD and the Ernst & Young Global Executive, a guide
on taxation of individuals.
Our second independent variable is the overall tax on dividend income (ODT rate). This
tax rate is calculated by the following formula: ODT rate = 1-(1-CIT)·(1-DT). Every
dollar a company earns in the market is first taxed by the corporate income tax rate (CIT
rate). If the resulting profits are distributed, the net personal income tax rate on dividend
income (DT rate) further reduces the dividend payout. The overall tax rate on dividend
income calculates the total burden of these two tax rates. As corporate income tax rate,
we use the top statutory corporate income tax rate applicable to small and medium-size
companies according to the OECD tax database. The net personal dividend tax rate
(DT) is the net top statutory rate on dividend income to be paid at the shareholder level,
taking into account all types of tax relief and gross-up provisions. The evolution of the
independent variables is depicted in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of tax rates over time
(a) Capital gains tax rate (b) Overall tax rate on dividend income
We get information on consecutive funding rounds for a large sample of venture capital-
backed companies with name, country, founding date, date of investment round, round
description, and the final company status from the Private Equity module of the Thomson
One database published by Thomson Reuters.9 For our dataset, we select all rounds which
are classified as venture capital investment, such as “Seed”, “Early Stage”, “Expansion”,
capital gains tax rates apply, e.g. five years.
9The total investment of one round is usually not provided by one, but by several venture capitalists.
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or “Later Stage”. Rounds whose description indicates a relationship with private equity
(e.g. “MBO", “LBO", “Bridge Loan", etc.) are deleted. Additionally, we restrict our
dataset to companies that received their first investment after 1999 as the Thomson One
database has a good international coverage only after this date according to Brander, Du,
and Hellmann (2010).
In the first part of our analysis we estimate the effect of taxes on the number of firms
receiving their first investment. To do this, we count the number of firms receiving their
first investment in each country-year combination and call this variable #Firms. We
match this variable with the tax rates in the year before the funding round took place.
This is the same timing assumption as in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2008).10 As no tax rate varies below the country-year level, we can then aggregate our
data without loss of information on this level. The summary statistics for all employed
variables in this first dataset in the period from 2000 to 2009 are given in Table 3.2 and
the evolution of the number of firms over time for four large economies is depicted in
Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The number of firms receiving their first investment over time
In the second part of the analysis we estimate the effect of taxes on the probability of a
venture capital-backed company receiving a follow-up investment round. Therefore, our
second dependent variable, Investment, is a dummy which indicates for every investment
If this is the case, the aggregate these investments to one round. Funding rounds do not necessarily
correspond to the development stages of the company, i.e. a start-up can have several funding rounds
during its “Early Stage".
10In Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008) the authors match the investment of venture
capitalists with the lagged market-to-book of traded technology stocks to estimate the influence of public
market signals on investment.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the number of firms analysis
mean sd min max p10 p90
# Firms 131.36 350.93 0.00 3523.00 7.00 201.00
Capital Gains Tax 19.90 10.93 0.00 45.00 0.00 30.00
ODT rate 43.52 9.46 19.00 72.00 34.39 55.72
Net personal tax (PIT) 24.62 11.48 0.00 60.00 12.50 41.50
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 24.96 6.66 11.33 52.00 16.00 33.00
Observations 181
round whether there was a subsequent funding round or whether the venture realized a
successful exit. In case a follow-up round or a successful exit occurred, the variable is set
equal to one and to zero otherwise.
The following ThomsonOne exit types for the investee company are classified as successful:
acquisition, pending acquisition, merger, in registration for an IPO, or went public. In
contrast, if an investee company is active, defunct or bankrupt it is regarded as failure.
This classification is similiar to the one used by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein
(2008).11 This dummy is then matched with the ODT tax rate and the capital gains tax
rate. The summary statistics for our second dataset from 2000 and 2007 are given in
Table 3.3. In total, our dataset comprises 31,905 funding rounds of 17,008 companies in
24 different countries from 2000 to 2007. Figure 3.3 shows the probability of investment
over time.
Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables
mean sd min max p10 p90
Investment 59.29 49.13 0.00 100.00 0.00 100.00
Capital Gains Tax 19.96 6.42 0.00 43.00 10.00 26.80
ODT rate 42.51 7.80 19.00 72.00 34.60 49.60
Net personal tax (PIT) 24.75 7.99 0.00 46.00 17.00 32.30
Corporate Income Tax (CIT) 22.27 6.18 11.33 52.00 18.59 30.00
Duration of successful rounds 365.08 314.66 1.00 2846.00 84.00 747.00
Average Number of rounds 1.81 1.46 1.00 15.00 1.00 4.00
Observations 31905
A trade sale or an initial public offering are the two most favored exit routes for venture
capitalists, yielding the highest returns (Cochrane 2005). In contrast, companies, which
11According to the data description Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008) do not include
the category “Pending Acquisition” as a successful exit. It seems logical to include it as “In Registration”
for an IPO is also included. A classification for a successful exit similar to ours is also used by other
authors (Hochberg and Lu 2007, Brander, Du, and Hellmann 2010).
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Figure 3.3: Evolution of the investment probability over time
(a) for different countries (b) for different stages in the US
cannot be sold and stay as “active” companies in the investors’ portfolio, are regarded
as unsuccessful. However, classifying active companies as a failure might be controversial
because a company needs some time to succeed or fail. We cannot determine whether
a company, which received its last funding round at the end of our dataset in 2009,
gets a subsequent funding round, manages an exit through an IPO or will stay “active”
forever. Consequently, we restrict our second dataset to companies that received their
last investment round before 2008. Thus, we analyze only complete investment histories
of companies from inception to exit: Every company in our sample had at least two years
to secure further financing or to exit successfully and we can be reasonably sure that the
final company status reflects the exit route.
We match the dependent variable Investment with the individual capital gains tax rate
and the overall tax rate on dividend income at the date of the current round. This is again
the same timing assumption as in Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2008). Our
data does not contain the exact date when the investment decision is taken and therefore
we cannot exactly determine the relevant tax rate applicable at the date of the decision.
We only know that the decision date is weakly after the current round date and weakly
before the date of the next round. As we observe only the next round date for firms
with a follow-up round we would have to assume an arbitrary round length to impute the
relevant tax rate. In order to circumvent this problem, we use the tax rates at the current
round date as explanatory variable.
To arrive at our final dataset, we do two more things: First, we set up our panel in funding
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round time instead of calendar time. To consider the effect of taxes on investment decisions
we have to correlate the tax data at the time the investment decision is taken. As we
assume that the VC takes the investment decision at the round dates but not in other
years, we drop years without a decision by setting the time dimension of the panel to
funding round time. This assumption is harmless, as the duration of a successful round is
on average about one year and therefore calendar time is approximately equal to funding
round time.
Second, we delete all firms in all countries which do not have a stock market with listed
technology stocks.12 We do this by selecting countries and years in which the technology
subsector index from the Thomson Reuters “Datastream” database has a non-missing
value. If a company is funded in a country without an appropriate stock market, it is
not clear whether the venture capitalist expects to take the company public. Therefore,
taxes might have no or a much lower effect in such countries and by including them we
would estimate a mixture of the coefficient of interest and zero. The excluded countries,
which did not have a stock market for technology companies over the whole timespan, are
Austria, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, and New Zealand. Australia is excluded
until 2003 and Norway until 2004. An overview of the countries and time span are given
in Table 3.4.
3.4 Empirical Specification and Results
3.4.1 The Effect of Taxes on the Number of Companies
To analyze the effect of the overall tax rate on dividend income (ODT rate) and of
the individual capital gains tax rate on the number of companies receiving their first
investment, we estimate equation (3.1).
#Firms = β0 +β1Lagged ODT rate+β2Lagged Capital Gains Tax+Controls+ε (3.1)
12The importance of an active stock market for venture capital investment volumes is shown, for
example, by Jeng and Wells (2000), Schertler (2003), and Da Rin, Nicodano, and Sembenelli (2006).
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Table 3.4: Sample selection
Country Time-Span #Firms
1 Australia 2000-2009 141
2 Belgium 2000-2009 237
3 Canada 2002-2009 794
4 Denmark 2001-2009 212
5 France 2000-2009 1,429
6 Finland 2000-2009 445
7 Germany 2000-2009 1,013
8 Hungary 2000-2009 106
9 Israel 2002-2009 121
10 Italy 2000-2009 266
11 Japan 2000-2009 283
12 Korea 2005-2009 342
13 Netherlands 2000-2009 445
14 Norway 2005-2009 53
15 Poland 2000-2009 95
16 Spain 2000-2009 387
17 Suisse 2000-2009 159
18 Sweden 2000-2009 471
19 Turkey 2000-2009 10
20 United Kingdom 2000-2009 1,756
21 United States of America 2000-2009 8,243
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Our preferred estimation method is a negative binomial model (NB2), appropriate for
count data with overdispersion, because the dependent variable has a variance approx-
imately three times larger than the mean, as shown in the summary statistics in Table
3.2. In all specifications we use country- and year fixed-effects as controls. Therefore, we
identify the parameters β1 and β2 with the variation of tax rates within a country over
time. The country dummies take up the effect of constant unobserved country-specific
factors that might be correlated with the tax rates and thus bias our estimates. For
example such factors might include the quality of the university system and the general
entrepreneurial attitude. A full set of year dummies control in a nonparametric fashion
for a potential time trend in both regressions.
To account for the correlation of tax rates within a country over time, we cluster the
standard errors of our estimates on the country level. Thus we allow for an arbitrary
correlation structure of the error terms within a country and prevent the over-rejection of
the null hypothesis of no effect (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004).13 However, this
estimation strategy does not take into account that there might be a correlation across
countries within a certain year due to common shocks like the burst of the tech bubble in
the early 2000s. To show the robustness of our results we use two-way clustered standard
errors together with OLS following Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011) in one of the
specifications.
We can identify the causal effect of taxes from the coefficients β1 and β2, if (and only if) the
tax rates are not caused by some other time varying left-out variable that also influences
the number of companies receiving their first investment. This seems plausible as we use
general tax rates which might be exogenous to decisions in the entrepreneurial sector.
If taxes are, for example, raised to reduce a government deficit, it is unlikely that they
are accompanied by other measures changing new business creation. In other cases this
assumption might be more problematic: If a newly elected policy maker is interested in
fostering entrepreneurship, she might lower taxes and at the same time reduce regulation
or increase subsidies to entrepreneurship. This being the case, we cannot distinguish the
13Unfortunately, a country-fixed effect or an appropriate within transformation does not ameliorate
the serial correlation problem in our case like in Da Rin, Giacomo, and Sembenelli (2010). The serial
correlation of errors within a country derives from serial correlated levels of taxation and not from a
common factor.
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Table 3.5: The effect of taxes on the number of companies receiving the first investment
The sample consists of yearly observations for 24 countries from 2000 to 2009. The dependent variable in
the first column is the number of companies receiving their first investment in a certain country and year.
In the second and third regression the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of companies funded
in a country plus one. In the fourth regression we standardize the log of companies plus one with the
population size in the country. The independent variables in all regressions below are the capital gains
tax rate and the overall tax rate on dividend income (ODT rate) in year t-1, country, and year dummies.
Please refer to the text for the construction of these variables and the data sources. The estimation in
the first regression is a negative binomial model with dispersion depending on the mean, a NB2 model.
In all other regressions we use ordinary least squares.
The standard errors in the third regression are clustered on country and year level. In all other specifica-
tions the standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered on the country level. ***, **, * indicate
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Firms log(# Firms+1) log(# Firms+1) log(# Firms per capita)
Lagged Capital Gains Tax -2.49 -4.13 -4.13 -4.29
(2.49) (3.49) (3.93) (3.42)
Lagged ODT rate -2.12∗∗∗ -1.85∗∗ -1.85∗∗ -1.62∗
(0.75) (0.81) (0.74) (0.80)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model NB 2 OLS Two-Way OLS
Log Likelihood -745.6 -97.3 -90.0
Number of Observations 181 181 181 170
effect of the tax change from the latter two measures. Generally, we have problems with
identification, if tax changes are embedded in synchronized programs to help or harm the
entrepreneurial sector. In this case, our coefficients estimate the effect of the combined
measures. Nevertheless, we think that even in that case such a statistic is of interest to
the policy maker in its own right.
The results of the negative binomial model are reported in the first column of Table 3.5.
The estimated coefficient of the lagged ODT rate is significantly different from zero at
the one percent level in our preferred specification. If we take our estimation at face
value, a reduction in the lagged ODT rate of one percentage point increases the number
of firms receiving their first investment by 2.12 percent. With a mean of 131 companies
funded in every country per year, such a tax reduction results in around two more new
ventures funded. The estimated coefficient for the lagged capital gains tax rate is negative.
However, as it is not significantly different from zero, we cannot draw any conclusions
about its influence.
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As robustness checks we estimate in column (2) an OLS regression with the logarithm
of the number of companies funded as dependent variable and an OLS model where we
standardize the number of companies funded with the size of the population in the fourth
column. In the third column we cluster the standard errors on country and year. The
log specification is often used for but not tailored to count data and therefore should be
interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, the results of all OLS specifications are in line
with the findings of the negative binomial model: The estimated coefficient for the overall
dividend tax is negative and significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level.
The coefficient for the capital gains tax rate is negative but insignificant at conventional
levels.
3.4.2 The Effect of Taxes on Follow-Up Investments
In order to appraise the effect of taxes on the probability of receiving follow-up funding,
we estimate the following equation:
Investment = β0 + β1ODT rate + β2Capital Gains Tax + Controls+ ε (3.2)
The dependent variable Investment is an indicator that takes a value of one if the com-
pany under consideration receives a subsequent funding round or manages a successful
exit (and zero otherwise). The overall tax rate on dividend income and the capital gains
tax rate at the current round date serve as independent variables.
In our main specification we include firm fixed-effects to control for firm-specific hetero-
geneity. This is a methodological improvement compared to prior research which often
included only country-fixed effects. As we (potentially) observe repeated investments in
the same company, it is possible to use firm-fixed effects to control for time-invariant char-
acteristics of the firm such as the quality of the business idea or a key technology (Kaplan,
Sensoy, and Strömberg 2009). The company’s quality might be positively correlated with
the tax burden and bias our estimates when left out. In the second specification, we use
OLS with country- and industry-fixed effects as an alternative.14
14Unfortunately, we cannot include firm fixed effects together with country- and industry-fixed effects
in the same regression. No firm in our data changes the industry or the country. Consequently country-
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Our estimates show the causal effect of the two taxes on the investment probability if noth-
ing else changes at the same time taxes and the probability of investment. As already
noted above, this assumption is dubious if the tax changes are embedded in programs
targeted at increasing or decreasing entrepreneurship. However, in this regression the po-
tential endogeneity problem is less severe than in the analysis on the number of companies
receiving a first investment, because we consider only companies that already received an
investment. These companies, especially in later stages, do not rely much on subsidies
like incubators, start-up loans, or coaching provided by state-sponsored programs.
The results of the firm-fixed effects regression and of an OLS regression with country-
and industry-fixed effects are reported in Table 3.6. According to our main specification
in column (1), we can reject the hypothesis that the individual capital gains tax rate
has no influence on the probability of a company receiving a follow-up investment at a
significance level of one percent. The probability that a VC backed company receives a
follow-up investment is reduced by 2.35 percentage points per percentage point increase in
the capital gains tax rate. The regression in the second column shows that the capital gains
tax has a negative effect over the whole investment cycle. The estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero at least at the five percent level. In the OLS specification
in column (3) the effect is weaker with a mean estimate of around minus one percentage
point but is still significant at the ten percent level.
The estimated size of the effect is economically relevant: For example, assume that a
country reduces its capital gains tax rate by five percentage points and the average in-
vestment probability of receiving a follow-up funding is at the mean of our sample 59%
(Table 3.3). After the tax cut, the survival probability is about 69.9% (59+2.35·5). Thus,
the chance of this company receiving a follow-up investment increases by a total of 10.9
percentage points or about 18% relative to the mean before the tax cut. As mentioned
above, our estimates might include the effect of other measures implemented at the same
time and therefore should be regarded as an upper bound of the true effect.
The estimated coefficient of the overall tax rate on dividend income (ODT rate) is negative
but not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. An increase in the ODT
and industry-fixed effects are perfectly collinear with the firm-fixed effect and not separately identified.
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Table 3.6: The effect of taxes on the probability of receiving a follow-up investment
The unit of observation is a funding round of a VC-backed company. The dependent variable is a dummy
which is one if the company under consideration receives a subsequent investment round, goes public, or
is acquired. Otherwise the dummy is zero. The ODT rate is the overall personal and corporate income
tax on dividends at the current round date. The Capital Gains Tax is the individual capital gains tax rate
at the current round date. In specifications (2) and (4) we combine these two tax rates with indicators for
the different investment stages to obtain a separate estimate for the “Seed”, “Early Stage”, “Expansion”,
and “Later Stage” development stage. We include year, stage, round and firm-fixed effects as controls
in the first two columns. In the last two specifications we substitute the firm fixed-effects by dummies
for the country and the industry and use a random effects estimator. The standard errors reported in
parentheses are clustered on country level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment Investment Investment Investment
Capital Gains Tax -2.35∗∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.35)
Capital Gains Tax - Seed -1.62∗∗ -0.90∗∗
(0.77) (0.36)
Capital Gains Tax - Early Stage -2.06∗∗ -1.12∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.37)
Capital Gains Tax - Expansion -2.65∗∗∗ -1.29∗∗∗
(0.67) (0.45)
Capital Gains Tax - Later Stage -1.99∗∗ -0.94∗∗
(0.78) (0.39)
ODT rate -0.13 0.00
(0.22) (0.15)
ODT rate - Seed -0.04 0.09
(0.33) (0.16)
ODT rate - Early Stage -0.24 -0.07
(0.18) (0.13)
ODT rate - Expansion -0.52∗ -0.26
(0.30) (0.28)
ODT rate - Later Stage 0.11 0.10
(0.33) (0.23)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No
Model FE FE OLS OLS
Adj. R-squared 0.340 0.341 0.232 0.232
Number of Observations 31905 31905 31905 31905
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rate of one percentage point leads to a reduced probability of receiving another funding
round of 0.13 percentage points. According to column (2), the mean estimate of the effect
has the largest size and is significantly different from zero at the ten percent level in the
expansion stage. In the OLS specification in column (3) we do not find an effect that is
significant at conventional levels.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study considering empirically the effect of
taxes on the re-investment probability of venture capital backed companies. Therefore, we
cannot compare our findings with prior estimates on this topic. Theoretically, Keuschnigg
and Nielsen (2004b) examined the effect of the considered tax rates on the entrepreneurial
effort and advice given by venture capitalists. They find that both, the tax on dividends
and the capital gains tax rates reduce entrepreneurial effort and advice. Supposing that
a lower effort and advice reduces the probability of receiving a follow-up investment, our
results are in line with their theoretical predictions.
3.5 Robustness: Changing the Time-Span
A major concern regarding the robustness of our results is the considered time-span. The
dot-com bubble reached its peak in March 2000 and deflated during 2001. At the end of
our sample period in 2008 to 2009, the financial crisis broke out. If, for example, during
such a crisis the government introduced a series of measures to help the entrepreneurial
sector and a tax change happened at the same time, our estimates might wrongly reflect
the overall effect of these measures and not only of the tax change. If this is not the case,
we might lose information by restricting our sample.
In the main specification of our first analysis we study the number of companies receiving
their first funding in the years 2000 to 2009. For convenience reasons, the results of
this main specification are again reported in column (1) of Table 3.7. In column (2) we
exclude the tech-bubble. The estimated coefficient for the lagged overall dividend tax rate
is again statistically different from zero on the one percent significance level. In contrast
to our main specification, the estimate for the lagged capital gains tax rate is negative and
significantly different from zero at the one percent level. Excluding 2008 to 2009 in column
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Table 3.7: Changing the time-span: the number of companies receiving their first funding
The sample consists of yearly observations for 24 countries. The dependent variable in all regressions
below is the number of companies funded in a certain country/year. The independent variables in all
regressions below are the capital gains tax rate and the overall tax rate on dividend income (ODT rate)
in year t-1, country and year dummies. Please refer to the text for the construction of these variables
and the data sources. In column (1) the estimation sample covers the years 2000 to 2009. In the second
column, the period 2000 to 2001 is excluded. In specification (3) we consider the period 2000 to 2007.
In the last column, the estimation sample covers the period 2002 to 2007. The estimation method for all
regressions is a NB2 model. The standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered on country level.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Firms # Firms # Firms # Firms
Lagged Capital Gains Tax -2.49 -5.55∗ -1.56 -4.78∗
(2.49) (3.17) (2.45) (2.61)
Lagged ODT rate -2.12∗∗∗ -2.80∗∗∗ -2.09∗∗∗ -3.06∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.94) (0.62) (0.89)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model NB 2 NB 2 NB 2 NB 2
Time span 2000-2009 2002-2009 2000-2007 2002-2007
Countries -745.6 -615.0 -588.8 -457.2
Log Likelihood 181.0 154.0 139.0 112.0
(3) delivers the same results for the lagged ODT rate as before. However, the estimated
coefficient for the capital gains tax is not significant anymore. If we exclude both time-
spans, 2000 to 2001 and 2008 to 2009, as we do in the last column, the resulting coefficients
for the ODT are still significant at the one percent level. The estimated coefficient for
the lagged capital gains tax rate becomes again significantly different from zero at the ten
percent level. In a nutshell we do not find evidence which stand in contrary to our results
in the main text.
In the main specification of our second analysis on the probability of a company receiving
a follow-up funding round, we analyze the investments of the years 2000 to 2007. If
we include companies with an investment in 2008, we potentially mis-classify companies
waiting for their next investment round as failures, as we can only see follow-up rounds
taking place in 2009. In column (1) of Table 3.8 the results of our main specification are
reported for comparison purposes. In columns (2) and (4) we exclude the period of 2000
to 2001 and find similar results as in our main specification. The same is true if we include
the year 2008 (columns (3) and (4)). The capital gains tax rate exerts a negative influence
on follow-up investments in all specifications that is significant at the one percent level.
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Table 3.8: Changing the time-span: the effect of taxes on the probability to receive a
follow-up funding
The unit of observation is a funding round of a VC-backed company. The dependent variable is a
dummy which is one if the company under consideration receives a subsequent investment round, goes
public, or is acquired. Otherwise the dummy is zero. The ODT rate is the overall personal and corporate
income tax on dividends at the current round date. The Capital Gains Tax is the individual capital
gains tax rate at the current round date. We include year, stage, and firm-fixed effects as controls in
all specifications. The estimation sample is for the period 2000 to 2007 in column (1). In the second
specification we exclude 2000 and 2001. In the last two columns we include 2008. The standard errors
reported in parentheses are clustered on country level. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Investment Investment Investment Investment
Capital Gains Tax -2.35∗∗∗ -2.89∗∗∗ -2.66∗∗∗ -3.41∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.54) (0.58) (0.50)
ODT rate -0.13 -0.45∗∗ -0.24 -0.61∗∗
(0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Stage Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effect No No No No
Industry Fixed Effect No No No No
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Model FE FE FE FE
Time span 2000-2007 2002-2007 2000-2008 2002-2008
Adj. R-squared 0.340 0.419 0.357 0.428
Number of Observations 31905 15131 38175 20309
The coefficient of the ODT rate is negative and significantly different from zero at the 5%
level in the second and fourth specification. However, the mean estimate is small and not
economically meaningful.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter offers a new view on tax policy in the entrepreneurial process. The influence
of policy interventions can be separated into the effect on the number of companies starting
the investment cycle and on the survival probabilities of companies (i.e. the probability of
receiving a follow-up investment) within the cycle. We find that higher taxes on dividends
lead to a lower number of firms starting the process but do not influence the probability to
receive a follow-up funding. The capital gains tax significantly influences the probability
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of receiving a follow-up investment but does not influence the entry margin. Put in a
nutshell, our findings imply that the state can influence entrepreneurial activities by tax
policy.
Our study might contribute some empirical evidence to the policy discussion on the tax-
ation of carried interest in the United States which started in the early 2000s. The aim
of different legislative proposals was to increase the taxation of capital gains received by
the venture capitalist from 15% to the level of 39% on ordinary income. In many other
countries similar discussions followed that aimed at adjusting the taxation of carried in-
terest to the regular income tax rate instead of the capital gains tax rate. Our findings
imply that such a tax increase might indeed harm the probability of existing companies
receiving a follow-up funding round. Unfortunately, we cannot give a quantitative esti-
mate of the expected effect, as we only consider an overall dividend and capital gains
tax rate in our study. We also have no data on the differential classification of certain
investment returns, as either capital gains or income. Our estimate is a combination of
the effect of taxes on the decision of entrepreneurs, the venture capitalists, and the limited
partners. Therefore, we cannot isolate the cause of the effect and ascribe it to one special
tax treatment. However, we think that limited partners are often tax exempt - especially
in the U.S. - and entrepreneurs would always favor additional investments. Thus, our
results might be a good approximation of the effects of the proposed tax increase.
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Single Period Profit Function
The mode of product market competition is capacity constraint quantity competition as
in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004).
The inverse demand function P (qi, qj) with P as market price and qi as quantity produced
by firm i is given by
P (qi, qj) =
a
b
− qi + qj
b
.
Suppose that firm i and firm j’s capacities are given by (q̄i, q̄j) and that they compete in
the product market by setting quantities (qi, qj).
The profit-maximization problem for firm i with i, j ∈ (1, 2), i 6= j is then given by
max
0<qi<q̄i
P (qi + qj)qi
. This maximization problem for i and the symmetric problem for j lead to symmetric re-
action functions which are known to have a unique Nash Equilibrium (Vives (2001)). The
single period profit function of firm i in the Nash equilibrium of the capacity constrained
quantity setting game is therefore
πi(q̄i, q̄j) = P (q∗i + q∗j )q∗i .
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The demand parameters used in the simulation are a = 40 and b = 10 and are thus the
same as in Besanko and Doraszelski (2004). These parameters ensure that a company
can have more capacity than the entire market demand.
Table A.1: Profit of firm 1
j=1 j=2 j=3 j=4 j=5 j=6
q̄j = 0 q̄j = 5 q̄j = 10 q̄j = 15 q̄j = 20 q̄j = 25
i=1 q̄i = 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i=2 q̄i = 5 18 15 13 10 9 9
i=3 q̄i = 10 30 25 20 15 15 15
i=4 q̄i = 15 38 30 23 18 18 18
i=5 q̄i = 20 40 31 23 18 18 18
i=6 q̄i = 25 40 31 23 18 18 18
Note: i and j
denote the number of capacity blocks held by firms i and j.
A.2 Welfare Measures
To evaluate the implication of credit rationing on welfare, we calculate the expected
consumer surplus and the expected producer surplus of the firms and of the bank.
Expected consumer surplus is calculated by integrating the demand function
CS = E
[∫ pmex(s)
pMarket
D(t)dt
]
where D(·) is the demand function, pmax is the choke price and pMarket is the prevailing
market price. The expectation is taken with respect to the probability of the state in
equilibrium.
As marginal costs are normalized to zero, expected producer surplus for every state is
calculated as the sum of profits minus the financing costs:
PS = E [π(q̄1, q̄2) + π(q̄2, q̄1) − d1 · r − d2 · r] .
Expected bank surplus is the interest rate differential multiplied by the sum of debt:
BS = E [(r − rBank) · (d1 + d2)] .
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A.3 Transitory Dynamics
Figure A.1 shows the distribution after 10, 20, and 50 periods, starting from the initial
value of zero capacities for both players. The distribution without credit rationing evolves
directly towards symmetry and stays there forever. With credit rationing, first a symmet-
ric configuration with equal capacity for both firms is reached and then the distribution
becomes asymmetric. There is a large probability that one firm exits the market on the
equilibrium path.
A.4 The Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
In this section, we outline the reinforcement learning algorithm used in the first chapter.
It is a variant of the algorithm described in Fershtman and Pakes (2011), to which the
reader should refer for an extensive description.
Intuitively, the algorithm employed works as follows: a firm starts in state s and time t.
For every potential action a and state s, the firm holds beliefs W (at, st) about the expected
discounted sum of cash flows the action will yield. The firm then chooses the best action a∗
according to its beliefs and receives an instant payoff of div(a∗t , st). The actions together
with the law of motions of the state variables prescribe the next state. In the next state,
the firm chooses again its best actions according to its belief W (at+1, st+1). At this point,
the algorithm can update the belief W (a∗t , st) because div(at, st) and W (a∗t+1, st+1) are
part of the discounted sum of cash flows originating in st if at is chosen. This procedure
is repeated for Iter periods. The optimal actions at in every period are stored in memory
for use in the equilibrium testing procedure. To test for an equilibrium, the algorithm
simulates a large number of periods with the stored optimal actions and checks whether
the resulting beliefs W test(a, s) are the same as the beliefs W (a, s) which justified the
actions in the first place.
A tentative example: Assume that the player is in state s. Assume further that the
player is under the impression that storing five more units of cash starting from state
s gives—for the sake of illustration—a continuation value of 2000. This is better than
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Figure A.1: Transitory dynamics for R = 5% (left) and R = 120% (right)
Note: The capacity states of the two firms are depicted on the x and y axes. The probability of a state
is displayed on the z-axis. On the left hand side, the evolution without credit rationing is pictured. On
the right hand side, severe credit rationing prevails.
the alternative of not doing so as he believes that this gives him a continuation value of
1500. He stores five more units and then finds out during the play that this decision only
resulted in a continuation value of 1600. So he adjusts his expectation of storing five units
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in state s downwards to 1800. He does not adjust it downwards to 1600 as he cannot
perfectly distinguish if this was just a matter of bad luck or truly the consequence of his
actions. The benefit of this solution algorithm is that it can accommodate larger state
spaces than the commonly used Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm. This algorithm
only calculates policies on the recurrent state space and therefore ignores states which
are never played in equilibrium. To give an idea, the state space in our calculation has
about 6.25 ·1012 states. By selecting only those states relevant to the equilibrium, we only
have to calculate equilibrium policies for around one million states, which is still large but
manageable. The idea of calculating policies in an Ericson-Pakes model only for a sample
of states is gaining prominence in numerical analysis, e.g., another algorithm using this
method is Farias, Saure, and Weintraub (2010).
There are also several known problems for this kind of algorithms and numerical simula-
tions of imperfect competition in general:
1. It is not guaranteed that an equilibrium exists. Even if one exists, the algorithm
does not necessarily converge to it.
2. There might be multiple equilibria for reasonable parameter values. Besanko, Do-
raszelski, Kryukov, and Satterthwaite (2009) offer a possible solution, however, we
did not explore this issue up to now.
3. There might be more than one recurrent class associated with a set of policies.
4. It is not clear that the off-equilibrium beliefs are irrelevant for the equilibrium play.
This is known as the problem of insufficient exploration.
In line with common practice, we check if the algorithm converges to the same equilibrium
for different starting values. Although this appears to be the case, the above mentioned
issues should be kept in mind.
Scheme of the algorithm: The algorithm requires the following inputs:
• A set of beliefs about the continuation value for every action in every state W (a, s)
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• A counter h(a, s) for every state and action which measures how often the action
was taken
• An arbitrary initial state s̆ and an arbitrary initial action ă
• An instant return function div(at, st) for every action and state
• A function assigning the next period’s state s′ conditional on today’s state s and
action a, f(·).
• Technical parameters: length of iteration (Iter), ε precision of the approximation,
and the discount factor β
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Algorithm for calculating EBE
1: st = s̆, at = ă {Set initial state and initial actions }
2: repeat
3: t:=0 {Set index t for best simulation}
4: while t<=Iter {Begin learning process, last for T periods}
5: t = t + 1
6: st+1 = f(at, st) {Assign next state in t + 1 according to the optimal actions and state in t }
7: Load W (·, st+1) for all at+1 from memory if already visited, otherwise assign initial values.
8: a∗t+1 = arg maxat+1 W (at+1, st+1)
{Calculate the optimal action}
9: h(a∗t+1, st+1) = h(a, s) + 1
{Increase the counter of the state st+1 and action at+1 by one. }
10: Ŵ (a∗t , st) = div(a∗t , st, ) + βW (a∗t+1, st+1)
{Calculate the continuation value in t according to the next period’s action and state.
W (at+1, st+1) is a draw of the integral governing the continuation value. }
11: W (a∗t , st) = W (a∗t , st) + 1h(a∗t+1,st+1) [W (a
∗
t , st) − Ŵ (a∗t , st)]
{save the updated belief W (a∗t , st) to memory and store the optimal a∗t action}
12: set st = st+1 and a∗t = a∗t+1
13: end
14: t = 0
15: while t<=T{Begin test procedure}
16: st+1 = f(a∗t , st) {Assign new state}
17: Load a∗t+1 and W (a∗t+1, st+1, ) from memory
18: h(a∗t+1, st+1) = h(a, s) + 1
{Increase the counter of the state st+1 and action at+1 by one. }
19: Ŵ test(a∗t , st) = div(a∗t , st) + βW (a∗t+1, st+1)
{Calculate the continuation value in t according to the next period’s action and state. }
20: W test(a∗t , st) = W test(a∗t , st) + 1a∗t+1,h(st+1) [W
test(a∗t , st) − Ŵ test(a∗t , st)]
{Update the belief about the continuation value. Also do the procedure for the square of W test(.)
to calculate the sampling variance.}
21: store W test(a∗t , st)
22: set st = st+1 and a∗t = a∗t+1
23: end
24: Bias(s, a) = W
test(a,s)
W (a,s)
2
− V ar(W
test(a,s)
W (a,s) )
{Calculate for every state and action visited on the equilibrium path a bias statistic. The
variance term is used to adjust for sampling variance. }
25: T =
∥∥∥∥∑a h(a,s)∑
a
h(a,s)Bias(a, s)||
∥∥∥∥
L2
P (s)
{The test statistic is then an L2 norm in the bias term where P (s) is a measure for the fraction
of time s is visited on the equilibrium path. The test statistic measures if the stored optimal
action can replicate the continuation values. }
26: until T < ε {The algorithm has converged if T is below the required precision ε. }
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B.1 Formal Results and Proofs
Without loss of generality, we define the density function of academic and business skills
on the unit square, i.e. f(α, β) ≥ 0 for α, β ∈ [0, 1] and zero otherwise. Furthermore,
rather than treating N as the absolute number of PhD places like in the main text, it
is convenient here to redefine it to be the number of places in the PhD programs as a
fraction of the whole population. As in the main text, we compare a generic boom to a
generic recession cohort, i.e. yBoom > yRec. Furthermore, a person applies for a PhD if he
has skills such that α > β + y.
In order to facilitate the proofs in the following, we do three more things: First, we define
different sets of applicants to keep our notation concise in the rest of this section. Second,
we define conditional probabilities to be able to compare different sets with each other.
Third, we show that the least able (in terms of academic skills) individual admitted into
academia in a recession is academically more able than the least able individual admitted
in a boom. This result is used repeatedly in the proofs of the propositions.
1. The following distinct sets of applicants are used in the proofs and illustrated in
Figure B.1:
• C(onstant) applicants, who enter academia no matter what happens in the
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business cycle.
C = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRec ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• B(usiness inclined), who only select themselves into academia if the business
climate necessitates it.
B = {(α, β)|α ≥ αRec ∧ β + yRec < α ≤ β + yBoom}
• A(cademically inclined), who want to go to academia but only have the chance
to if the group B members don’t apply.
A = {(α, β)|αBoom ≤ α < αRec ∧ α > β + yBoom}
• E(xternals), who never go to academia.
Figure B.1: Example with a U(0,1) distribution of both skills
Note that A ∪ C is the boom cohort and B ∪ C the recession cohort. Furthermore,
from our assumption that there are always more people applying for a PhD-program
than there are spaces, it follows that y has an upper bound.
2. We introduce the following notation for the probability of being member of the set
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X (or fulfilling the condition X) conditionally on being member of the set Y:
PY (X) =
P (X ∩ Y )
P (Y )
.
This conditional probability is always within [0,1] and can be interpreted as the
fraction of members of Y who are member of X. If the subscript Y is dropped, we
refer to the fraction X compared to all potential applicants. As mentioned above,
N is the the fraction of individuals actually entering the academic sector, i.e. in a
recession N = P (C ∪B) and in a boom N = P (C ∪ A).
3. We show that the cut-off value αs is weakly higher in recession than in boom.
A higher cut-off value implies that the least able (in terms of academic skills)
individual admitted into academia in a recession is academically more able than
the least able individual admitted in a boom.
Lemma B.1.1 αBoom ≤ αRec.
Proof of lemma B.1.1: Let gy(α) :=
∫ α−y
0 f(α, β) dβ be the percentage of students
with academic skill α who will apply to the PhD-program. Obviously yBoom >
yRec ⇒ gyBoom ≤ gyRec as f ≥ 0 for all (α, β). Therefore αRec ≥ αBoom as the
equality
∫ 1
αRec gyRec dα = N =
∫ 1
αBoom gyBoom dα has to hold.
Proof of proposition 2.2.1: : First, note that by the definition of A and B, PA(x ≥
α) = 0 if α > αRec and PB(x ≥ α) = 1 if α ≤ αRec. Second, as P (A) = P (B) =
N − P (C) it follows that PA∪C(x ≥ α) ≤ PB∪C(x ≥ α), which is the definition of first
order stochastic dominance. As the argumentation holds analogously for the business
skills, this implies a joint stochastic dominance of academic and business skills of the
recession cohort compared to the boom cohort.
Proof of proposition 2.2.2: In case of ygrad < yBoom some or no people in set B leave
the recession cohort and nothing changes in the boom cohort. If ygrad ≥ yBoom, all people
in B leave. All remaining members of the recession cohort (who are member of set C and
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may or may not leave) are a subset of the boom cohort and therefore behave alike. Note
that, as P(B) = P(A) and all members of B, but potentially only some members of A,
leave for ygrad ≥ yBoom, there are always more leavers in the recession than in the boom
cohort.
Proof of proposition 2.2.3: Let B′ be a subset of B. We show that C ∪ B′ first order
stochastically dominates C ∪ A in the partial distribution of academic skill, which is the
proposition for ygrad < yBoom. It follows for all α that
PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪B′(B′)PB′(x ≥ α),
and analogously PC∪A(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) + PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α). This means
that the percentage of members in C and B’ who have an academic skill larger than some
arbitrary α is the weighted sum of the percentage of members in C and of the percentage
of members in B’ who have at least such a high academic skill. The respective weights
are the percentage of members of C in C union B’ and the percentage of B’ in C union
B’. (Remember that PC∪B′(C) is the percentage of members of C in the union of C and
B′.)
Now one can show as in Proposition 2.2 :
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪B′(C)PC(x ≥ α) ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥ α) for
α ≥ αRec.
The first inequality holds by the decomposition of PC∪B′(x ≥ α) above, the second
inequality holds because P (A) = P (B) and the equality holds because PA(x ≥ α) =
0 for α ≥ αRec by definition of the set A.
• PC∪B′(x ≥ α) = 1 ≥ PC∪A(C)PC(x ≥ α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
+PC∪A(A)PA(x ≥ α) = PC∪A(x ≥ α) for
α < αRec. The first equality holds by the definition of C and B’, the first inequality
by the definition of probability measures (it cannot exceed one) and the second
equality holds by the definition above.
These two statements taken together prove the first order stochastic dominance in the
partial distribution of the academic skill for the recession cohort compared to the boom
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cohort.
Note, that the same argument can be made if ygrad ≥ yBoom with A′ and C ′ being subsets
of A and C, respectively, and B′ = ∅. This completes the proof.
For the proof of the last proposition we require one further piece of notation: Let yBoomgrad
denote the business cycle variable if there is a boom at graduation and yRecgrad if there is
a recession at graduation. Note that yBoomgrad >yRecgrad and therefore wBBoom = β + yBoomgrad >
wBRec = β + yRecgrad.
Proof of proposition 2.2.4: The PhD students with {α, β)|β+yRecgrad < α ≤ β+yBoomgrad }
leave academia when there is a boom instead of a recession at graduation. As this set can
be non-empty, weakly more students leave in a boom than in a recession.
B.2 Data Collection and Processing
This section explains in detail the data collection and processing procedure. Specifically,
we explain how the sample of economists and their background variables were acquired
and how we computed measures of publication success. An overview of the data sources
is given in Table B.1.
All employed programs are available from the authors upon request.
B.2.1 Database for Economics PhD Graduates
To construct our sample of economists, we downloaded the PDF version of all issues of
the American Economics Association’s (AEA) yearly “List of Doctoral Dissertations in
Economics” from JSTOR, an online journal repository, from 1950 to 2006. The list was
published in the Papers and Proceedings issue of the “American Economic Review” until
1986 and in the “Journal of Economic Literature” thereafter. The AEA “List of Doctoral
Dissertations in Economics” specifies doctoral degrees conferred by U.S. and Canadian
universities for every year since 1906. The name of the degree recipients and the year of
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Table B.1: Data sources
Variable Description Source
Personal information of
graduates
Name, University and Gradua-
tion year
AEA “List of Doctoral Disserta-
tions in Economics” of 1955 to
2004
Faculty membership Faculty directory of (mainly
American) Economics, Business
and Finance departments by
John R. Hasselback
“Faculty Directories,” James
R. Hasselback, accessed
2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
Membership in the AEA Membership data of the Amer-
ican Economic Association in
1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989,
1993, 1997, 2003 and 2007
Supplement to the Papers and
Proceedings Issue in the respec-
tive year digitalized by JSTOR
University ranking Tier of a university according to
the National Research Council
“The American Economic
Association Graduate
Study in Economics Web
Pages,” accessed 2011-02-08,
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/
AEA/gradstudents/
Publication records Publications in 74 journals listed
in the JSTOR online repository,
from 1955 to 2004
“JSTOR Data for Research,”
last accessed 2011-02-07, http:
//dfr.jstor.org/.
Journal rankings Citation ranking of journals in
Economics, Business and Fi-
nance from 1950 to 2000
Laband and Piette (1994),
Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas,
and Stengos (2003), Kim,
Morse, and Zingales (2006)
and “IDEAS/RePEc Recursive
Discounted Impact Factors
for Journals,” last accessed
2011-02-07, ideas.repec.org/
Measure of the business
cycle
seasonally adjusted change in un-
employment, unemployment lev-
els and GDP growth from 1949
to 1994
Thomson Reuters Datastream
Recession Indicators NBER recesssion indicators from
1949 to 1994
“The NBER’s Business Cy-
cle Dating Committee,”
last accessed 2011-08-09
http://www.nber.org/cycles/
recessions.html
Duration of the PhD Median years between registra-
tion and graduation from the
PhD for 1977, 1986, 1996, 1997,
2001
National Science Foundation,
Stock and Siegfried (2006),
Hansen (1991)
Number of Graduates
(NSF list)
Number of admitted and grad-
uating PhDs according to the
“NSF Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File” of
the National Science Foundation
“WebCASPAR Integrated
Science and Engineering Re-
source Data System - NSF
Survey of Earned Doctor-
ates/Doctorate Records File,”
National Science Founda-
tion, last accessed 2011-02-08,
https://webcaspar.nsf.gov/
econphd.net ranking University ranking according to
econphd.net
“Rankings.” last accessed
2011-02-07, http://econphd.
econwiki.com/rankings.htm
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graduation is provided to the American Economic Association by each degree granting
university.
To convert the available PDF version of the AEA doctoral list into a text file, we used
the optical character recognition (OCR) program included in the Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro-
fessional Suite. The quality of the Adobe technology was best compared to several other
programs we have tried. This read-in procedure worked well in general and it accelerated
the compilation of the dataset but, as every automated procedure, it also entailed several
problems and imperfections. In some cases the original PDFs were scans of old printed
versions and, therefore, due to the quality of the source files, the character recognition of
some records was erroneous.
Particularly, there were problems with the letter “r”, which was mistaken as “n” or “i”
from time to time. “O” was sometimes read as zero, “H” as “II”, and “M” as “IVI”. Also,
dots sometimes were not readily recognized. We were able to correct faulty university
names and graduation years because the set of those is finite. For example, we always
replaced “IVIichigan” by “Michigan”. Due to limited resources, we were not able to correct
all errors in the name spellings. We decided to drop observations with names that contain
characters or sequences of characters that are highly unlikely to be correct and thus had
no chance to return accurate results in a query for publications in JSTOR.
In the next step we used regular expressions, a way to assign database fields for some
string combinations, to convert the text file into a database format. The data structure
of the AEA doctoral list is quite regular so this procedure worked reasonably well. On
some instances, the employed regular expression was not able to determine the end of a
data entry due to missing dots. However, this did not happen systematically.
As mentioned above, the read-in procedure delivered some faulty results. We believe that
all these errors are orthogonal to our effect of interest and that they thus just add noise
to our data. Nevertheless we want to test how many read in names are faulty: To do
this, we first correct some years (perfectly) by hand and compare the resulting “complete”
graduation numbers to graduation numbers published by the National Science Foundation
(NSF). We find that the “complete” graduation numbers from the AEA list are about
90% of the NSF graduation numbers. Then, for every year, we compare the fraction of
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the “not corrected” number in our database to the number in the NSF data. This fraction
fluctuates from 0.6 to 0.9, which suggests that in the worst case we lose about 40% of
graduates due to the imperfect automated read-in procedure. In Figure B.2 the number
of NSF graduates and of graduates from our AEA list are plotted over time.
Figure B.2: Number of graduates according to the NSF and the AEA list over time
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In the next step we supplemented the information with the respective tier of the degree
granting university according to the National Research Council. The National Research
Council rankings of economics graduate programs divide programs into tiers.
We dropped all graduates from universities not represented in this NRC ranking because
we are not sure if the application process and research environment in these institutions
are comparable to the universities in the first three tiers. In order to ensure robustness
we also considered the Top 30 US universities according to the econphd.net ranking (as in
Oyer 2006), which yielded the same results. The econphd.net ranking is available online
on http://econphd.econwiki.com/rankings.htm (last accessed 2011-02-07).
B.2.2 Indicator for Being an Academic
To complete the person-specific background variables, we add an indicator if a PhD grad-
uate became an “academic” later on. We define “academics” according to the three
concepts explained in section 2.4.2 - those who are faculty members, those who are fac-
ulty members or AEA members, and those who publish at least one ranked article. While
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the last concept derives from our publication measure explained in the next subsection,
the data collection for the first two measures is described here.
Data about faculty membership in US economics, business or finance departments is
acquired from the webpage of James R. Hasselback from the University of West Florida
who regularly compiles U.S. faculty directories.1 Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive
database about faculty members of non-US universities, researchers in other US university
departments, like law and agriculture, and academics in institutions other than univer-
sities, e.g. World Bank researchers. To construct a proxy for belonging to these groups,
we analyze the membership records of American Economic Association. We think that
the likelihood of being an AEA member is higher, if the graduate decided to become a
member of the academic community.2
The faculty listings and the AEA membership directories are only available as PDF.
Therefore, we again use the Adobe OCR program and regular expressions to translate
them into a database file. We use Apache Lucene, an information retrieval library, to
match the data on graduates with the faculty listing and the AEA membership. This
is necessary because some students drop their second name over the years or abbreviate
it. As is common for search engines, Lucene employs a scoring algorithm based on the
similarity of the name of the graduate and the name in the documents.3 For the faculty
directory (and a sample of the AEA members), we checked the matches found by hand
to ensure accuracy.
B.2.3 Publications
After compiling the database of graduates, we used a program to match each entry with
its publication record in JSTOR. To do this, we use the newly available XML application
1“Faculty Directories,” James R. Hasselback, accessed 2011-02-07, http://www.
facultydirectories.com/
2Specifically, we take the AEA directory of members in 1970, 1974, 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997, 2003
and 2007.
3For a discussion of the scoring algorithm of Lucene please refer to “org.apache.lucene.search -
Class similarity,” last accessed 2011-02-07, http://lucene.apache.org/java/2_4_0/api/org/apache/
lucene/search/Similarity.html.
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programming interface of JSTOR, called “Data for Research” (DfR).4 Specifically, we
entered the names and given names of all researchers contained in our database and
extracted all recorded publications with journal title, number of pages and the number
and identity of coauthors in the first 10 years after their graduation. To be as specific as
possible, we restricted our search to articles classified as “research articles” published in
English language in the fields of economics, business and finance.
The restriction to articles published ten years after graduation (as in Oyer 2006), has three
reasons: First, it improves the specificity of the data processing, because economists with
the same name who were born in different decades are not merged but kept as different
persons. Second, the quality of an economist is arguably best revealed in the first decade
after PhD graduation. Academic researchers are highly motivated (incentivized) in this
period because their tenure decision depends on the publication record of these first years.
Finally, graduates from more recent years would be disadvantaged if we did not restrict
the time frame. Currently JSTOR provides full publication data up to the year 2004, so
the last individuals we can rightfully analyze following our ten year requirement are those
who graduated in 1994.
B.2.4 Ranking Methods and Interpretation of the Productivity
Measure
To measure the productivity of each individual on a cardinal scale, we have to value each
publication in the record. This poses three challenges: First, the relative weight of an
article in a certain journal compared to an article in another journal is a constant matter of
discussion in the profession. Second, comparing the value of publications over the decades
is difficult because the relative impact of economics journals has changed substantially
over time ( Kim, Morse, and Zingales 2006). Third, by summing up the contributions
of different publications over ten years, the resulting number becomes hard to interpret.
We adress these challenges by showing the robustness of our result for several ranking
4JSTOR (http://www.jstor.org/) (last accessed 2011-02-07) is a leading repository for archiving
academic journals which contains (in July 2010) around 3.1 Million research articles for all sciences with
the first article published in 1545. For the DfR interface please refer to “JSTOR Data for Research,” last
accessed 2011-02-07,http://dfr.jstor.org/.
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methodologies with different strengths and weaknesses below.
Our preferred method is a citation ranking based on the methodology of Laband and
Piette (1994). The authors of this study use the citations to articles in a particular journal
(excluding self-citations) as a measure of its quality or impact. Their paper presents the
journal impact factors from the 1960s to the 1980s, while Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and
Stengos (2003) use the same method for the 1990s and the recursive discounted ranking
on the ideas.org ranking page delivers us the impact factors for the 2000s.5 For the 1950s
we were not able to find a journal ranking and thus decided to extrapolate our 1960s
ranking back to articles published in the 1950s. In total, we collect impact factors of 74
ranked journals in economics, business and finance for five decades. Table B.2 provides
an overview of the dynamic ranking of the top forty journals used in this study.
The outcome measure in Table B.2 is denominated in publication points. The best journal
in each decade receives 100 points and all others are scaled accordingly. For example, in
the 1960s, a single-authored Econometrica article is worth 46.6 points while it is worth
96.8 points in the 1990s. The impact of the American Economic Review (AER) changed
even more dramatically: It has been the leading journal in the 1960s and 1990s with 93.3
and 100 respectively. In contrast, in the 1970s, 1980s and 2000s it was “only” a top tier
journal with 30-40 publication points. Consequently, when trying to interpret our results
above in terms of actual papers, we need to mention the journal and the decade (e.g. “one
third of an AER article in the 1990s”).
Reassuringly, we show in section B.6.1 that our results are extremely robust to using
several other intuitive productivity measures: publication points assigned according to
the currently very popular h-index, raw counts of articles written, and, most notably,
counts of articles in the five top economics journals (as in Oyer 2006) plus the Journal of
Finance.
5“IDEAS/RePEc Recursive Discounted Impact Factors for Journals,” last accessed 2011-02-07, http:
//ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html. Note, that this ranking is updated continu-
ously and thus its online version at the time of reading is not exactly the same as the one we use.
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Table B.2: Ranking of journals in different decades.
Rank Journal (ordered by 2000 rank) 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 65.6 16.2 41.6 58.1 100
2 Econometrica 46.6 31.6 78.4 96.8 68.7
3 Journal of Economic Literature - 100 100 18.8 63.5
4 The Review of Economic Studies 100 30.7 40.7 45.2 54.3
5 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity - 96.9 15.9 0.7 51.5
6 The Journal of Political Economy 63.5 59.1 63 65.2 49.8
7 Economic Policy - - - - 45.7
8 Journal of Labor Economics - - 15.4 12.8 45.5
9 The American Economic Review 93.3 34.5 40.2 100 39.9
10 The Journal of Economic Perspectives - - 23.3 34.3 39.8
11 The Review of Financial Studies - - - - 39.2
12 Journal of the European Economic Association - - - - 38.6
13 The RAND Journal of Economics (Bell Journal
of Economics)
- 39.5 40.2 11.4 38.2
14 The Journal of Finance 37.8 14.6 34.1 34.1 31.1
15 The Review of Economics and Statistics 59.8 12.4 6.5 28 21.7
16 Journal of Business & Economic Statistics - - 7.9 38.4 20.8
17 The Economic Journal 47.5 28 23.9 20.7 20.5
18 Journal of Applied Econometrics - - - 16.6 19.1
19 Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 18.5 22.1 18.6 18.6
20 The World Bank Economic Review - - - 5.7 18.5
21 International Economic Review 35.1 19 12.3 23 18.4
22 IMF Staff Papers - - - 5.1 18.3
23 Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization - - - 4.1 16.1
24 Journal of Law and Economics 51.8 43.3 33.1 3.9 14.1
25 The Journal of Human Resources - 13.6 4.6 21.3 13.4
26 Journal of Population Economics - - - 2.41 10.6
27 The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2.5 7.1 2.1 10.7 9.2
28 The Journal of Business 18.5 37.4 8.7 8.7
29 The Journal of Industrial Economics 14.9 16.4 16 3.85 8.7
30 The World Bank Research Observer - - - 0.9 8.5
31 The Journal of Financial and Quant. Analysis - 10.8 20 2.1 7.9
32 Oxford Economic Papers 35.2 16.8 25 3.7 7.9
33 Economica 20.7 36.2 4.1 4.5 7.2
34 Economic Theory - - - 22.4 6.8
35 Industrial and Labor Relations Review 17 18.8 23.4 - 6.1
36 Econometric Theory - - 3.3 45.8 5.9
37 The Canadian Journal of Economics - 11.8 10.2 5.09 5.6
38 The Journal of Legal Studies - - 51.6 5.4 5.4
39 Financial Management - - - - 5.1
40 Journal of Accounting Research - - - - 4.2
Note.—These are the first 40 out of 74 journals. The rankings for the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s are taken
from Laband and Piette (1994) and the ranking for the 1990s is from Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas, and
Stengos (2003). For the 2000s, we normalize the current discounted recursive impact factors ranking
from the IDEAS RePEc website (http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.rdiscount.html, last
accessed 2011-02-07) to make it comparable to the other rankings.
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B.2.5 Imputing the PhD Entry Date
Our data only contains the graduation date of each PhD student. Therefore we have to
impute the PhD entry date to relate the macroeconomic variation at application to each
PhD’s lifetime research productivity.
In our main analysis we substract six years, the median duration of a PhD, from the grad-
uation date and then use our measure of the business cycle at this date as macroeconomic
variation at entry. The median duration of a PhD stayed almost constant around five to
six years since the 1970s according to the data assembled in Table B.3. Unfortunately we
could not find evidence for the 1950s and 1960s.
Table B.3: Duration of a PhD
Year 1977 1986 1996 1997 2001
5.7 6.3 5.3 5.25 5.5
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Median years
of registered
time to PhD
Time
to degree
median time-
to-degree
Time
to degree
Source Hansen
(1991)
Hansen
(1991)
NSF* Stock,
Siegfried,
and Finegan
(2011)
NSF*
Note.—*NSF duration data includes masters degrees, therefore we subtract 1.5 years.
Using the median duration might be questionable, because there is considerable variation
in the length of PhD across individuals. For the 1997 graduating cohort, Stock, Siegfried,
and Finegan (2011) documented the distribution of completion times of those PhDs who
graduated within eight years: 14 percent graduated within four years, 25 percent within
five, 28 percent within six, 13 percent within seven, and 20 percent within eight or more
years. This substantial variability (standard deviation of 1.32 years) in the time to grad-
uation adds measurement error to our business cycle variation at application to the PhD.
We therefore repeat our main analysis with a weighted average of the respective business
cycle measure at application according to the distribution of completion times for the
year 1997. The results are reported in Table B.4. Note that the regressors have a much
lower variation because we compute moving averages here. Thus, if we want to compare
the results in Table B.4 to our main regressions in Table 2.2, we need to divide the point
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estimates for unemployment levels by about 1.2 and for the other regressors by about 2.6.
Nonetheless, the mean estimates in Table B.4 are larger and more significant than in the
main text. This suggests that the latter might be downward biased due to measurement
error.
Table B.4: The regression results using “weighted average” of PhD entry
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 4.05∗∗ -5.99∗∗∗ 10.18∗∗∗
(1.71) (1.52) (2.89)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.33∗∗∗ 1.26∗∗∗ 2.93∗∗
(0.65) (0.45) (1.19)
Unemployment (Application) 2.37∗∗ -1.18 4.54∗∗∗
(0.96) (1.44) (1.64)
Unemployment (Graduation) 1.90∗∗∗ -0.36 3.43∗∗∗
(0.66) (0.67) (1.17)
GDP Growth (Application) -1.33 2.55∗∗∗ -3.41∗∗
(0.85) (0.58) (1.29)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.70∗∗ -0.38 -0.80
(0.34) (0.25) (0.60)
Recession (Application) 15.16∗∗ -14.49∗∗ 34.26∗∗∗
(6.41) (6.03) (10.35)
Recession (Graduation) 5.33∗∗∗ 1.32 7.03∗∗
(1.84) (1.25) (2.98)
Subsample All All Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1023 1023 1005
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.3 Cyclicality of Academia versus Business
In our theory section we assume that compensation in the academic sector is less cyclical
than in the business sector. In this section we provide evidence that this is a reasonable
assumption. We focus on the cyclicality in the attractiveness of academia versus business
only at graduation from the PhD. At application, graduate school seems to be clearly
less cyclical than business—as was illustrated by the flood of applications to masters and
PhD programs during the crisis of 2008/09 (see Bedard and Herman (2008) for systematic
evidence for the period from 1993 to 2001).
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Ideally, we would like to compare the variability of the total expected lifetime compen-
sation (consisting of pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits) for the two sectors over the
business cycle. Unfortunately, this is not possible for two reasons: First, (variabilities in)
non-pecuniary benefits are hard to observe and difficult to compare across jobs. Second,
even the monetary component of compensation is difficult to obtain or to approximate.
Wage data for the business sector is not consistently available on a yearly basis over
longer time periods for Economics PhDs.6 Furthermore, even if wages were available,
they are a result of the selection process we are trying to explain (e.g. Solon, Barsky, and
Parker 1994). Consequently, it would be sensible to focus on wage offers in both sectors
as used by Scott Stern in a similar setting (Stern 2004). Unfortunately we are unable to
find such data.
In the following we approximate the relative attractiveness of the academic sector by
comparing the number of academic versus non-academic job offers for economists over
the business cycle.7 The underlying assumption is that an additional vacancy (weakly)
increases a sectors’ relative attractiveness. The number of new jobs is published annually
in the Job Openings for Economists (JOE) director’s report in the American Economic
Review’s Papers and Proceedings issue in May. The academic and non-academic openings
are broken up by new and total jobs and listings (employers). Since we want to approxi-
mate the decision situation of a graduate in year t during his job market year, we focus
on the sum of new job offers from August in year t-1 to July in year t.8 9
Figure B.3 plots the yearly sums of job offers over the years from 1977 to 2010. Academic
jobs are displayed in the upper-left panel and non-academic jobs in the upper right panel.
In the lower panel the overall number of job offers is plotted together with the number
of academic per non-academic jobs. Academic and non-academic jobs move together
in lockstep, which shows that the academic sector is in fact quite cyclical. However, the
relative number of academic jobs to non-academic jobs appears to be countercyclical: even
6We do not have access to any employer-employee matched dataset as in Oreopoulos, von Wachter,
and Heisz (2011).
7Oyer (2006) uses the academic job offers as a measure of demand for economists in academia.
8The seasonality of job offers within a given year follows the job market for each cohort, especially for
academic jobs. Job offers reach their trough in June after which they start rising. They literally jump
up in October and stay high during fall after which they decline. We therefore define each yearly sum of
job offers according to job market years instead of calender years.
9We do not use total jobs as we do not know if these jobs are double counted in several months.
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when the number of academic jobs rise, the number of non-academic jobs rises relatively
more. The reverse is true in recessions. Therefore, graduates have relatively more business
jobs (compared to academic jobs) to chose from in booms than in recessions.
Figure B.3: Academic and non-academic job offers over time
(a) Academic Job Offers (b) Non-Academic Job Offers
(c) Overall Job and Relative Academic Job
Offers
To formally test if business jobs are indeed more pro-cyclical than academic jobs, we
estimate the following system of equations
log(# Academic jobs)t = βAcademic · yt + δ · controls + εt (B.1)
log(# Non-Academic jobs)t = βNon−Academic · yt + δ · controls + εt (B.2)
where the dependent variables are the log of the number of new academic and non-
academic jobs, respectively, and yt is a measure of the business cycle. Then we test if
the business cycle has a larger influence on the number of non-academic jobs than on the
number of academic jobs, i.e. if βNon−Academic is larger than βAcademic in absolute values.
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The regressor yt is one of four business cycle measures: recession indicators, unemployment
levels and changes, and the log of GDP. The business cycle variables are measured in
October in the year before graduation when the mode of job offers for each cohort comes
in. The controls include dummies for the switch from seven to ten monthly reports of
job offers in 1999 and the JOE going online in 1995 interacted with a linear time trend.
We estimate the outlined specification in levels with a time trend and in first differences.
We do this to control for the potential trend or the non-stationarity of dependent and
independent variables.
Table B.5: Differing cyclicality of academic and non-academic jobs—levels
log(# Academic Jobs) log(# Non-Academic Jobs) z-Value
Unemployment -0.05∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 2.23**
(0.01) (0.02)
GDP 1.96∗∗∗ 4.06∗∗∗ -2.32***
(0.62) (1.08)
Recession 0.02 -0.08 1.57*
(0.05) (0.09)
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses. The z-Value is the test statistic of a one-sided test
for |βNon−Academic| > |βAcademic|. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Table B.5 and Table B.6 report the results of these regressions in levels and in first differ-
ences. Unemployment and GDP are significantly related to academic and non-academic
job offers in the way that we would have expected from figure B.3. Moreover, in levels,
the relationship is significantly stronger for non-academic than for academic jobs. For
example, a one percentage point increase in unemployment is approximately associated
Table B.6: Differing cyclicality of academic and non-academic jobs—first differences
FD log(# Academic Jobs) FD log(# Non-Academic Jobs) z-Value
Unempl Change -0.05∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.58
(0.01) (0.03)
GDP Growth 2.57∗∗∗ 3.09∗∗ -0.39
(0.62) (1.34)
FD Recession -0.00 -0.09 1.66**
(0.03) (0.06)
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses. The z-Value is the test statistic for a one-sided test
for |βNon−Academic| > |βAcademic|. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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with a nine percent decrease in the number of non-academic jobs and “only” a five percent
decrease in academic jobs. Recession indicators do not work that well. Although they are
significantly different from each other in the right direction, the estimated coefficients are
not significantly different from zero on their own. These results are qualitatively robust
to using total job openings instead of focusing on new ones, variations in the control
variables (e.g. including quadratic time trends), and a sensible alternative timing of the
business cycle variables.
Overall, we would state that we find reasonable support for the assumption that the
academic sector is less cyclical than the non-academic sector in the job openings for
economists. We think this is some prima facie evidence for our assumption that in down-
turns the academic sector becomes relatively more attractive as an employer compared to
the business sector. Moreover, we think that the above exercise is conservative because of
the following reason: the (variation in the) number of job offers is unlikely to approximate
well the (variation in) non-pecuniary benefits, which are substantial and probably stable
in research related jobs (see Stern 2004). Thus, total compensation in the academic
sector might be less cyclical than indicated by the number of jobs openings.
B.4 The Relationship Between (Potentially) Con-
founding Factors and the Business Cycle
This section addresses potential concerns about factors that might confound our results
and analyzes possible impacts on our estimates. In the following we address concerns
about the size of the entry and exit cohort, the attrition rate and the timing of gradu-
ation. Lastly, we adress a potential correlation of the business cycle at application and
graduation.
In order to do this, we calculate the number of graduates from our dataset (in the following
listed as “# of graduates (AEA)”) and match it with the business cycle at application
and at graduation. For conciseness, we focus on unemployment change as our preferred
measure for the business cycle. Then, we supplement this data with data from the National
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Science Foundation’s “Survey of Earned Doctorates”.10 From there we obtain the number
of PhD entrants and graduates for our top 30 universities since 1977. Using this data, we
are able to estimate the attrition (dropout) rate of each cohort as the difference of the
number of entrants minus graduates divided by the number of entrants. We report the
partial correlation coefficient of unemployment change at application and at graduation
with application and graduation numbers in Table B.7. In order to obtain the correct
standard errors we aggregate the data to yearly averages. To keep this section concise, we
only report for unemployment change and not for all four business cycle measures. These
correlation tables are available on request from the authors.
10This survey is publicly available through the WebCASPAR Interface: “WebCASPAR Integrated
Science and Engineering Resource Data System - NSF Survey of Earned Doctorates/Doctorate Records
File,” National Science Foundation, last accessed 2011-02-08, https://webcaspar.nsf.gov/.
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The first concern one might have is that the number of students admitted to the PhD
systematically increases (decreases) in recessions. Within the framework of our model, this
would weaken (strengthen) the selection effect at application. The estimated coefficient
of unemployment change at application might then be underestimated (overestimated).
According to Table B.7, we cannot reject that the relation of the number of entrants to
the PhD and the change in unemployment differs from zero on conventional significance
levels (p-value of 67.5%). In Figure B.4 the number of graduates in our data and the
unemployment change at application are depicted.
Figure B.4: Number of graduates and unemployment change at application
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Second, one might be concerned that the attrition (or dropout) rate during the program
may systematically differ between recession and boom cohorts. On the one hand, some
business-inclined individuals who entered the PhD in order to bridge a recession might
return to the private sector before they actually obtain the PhD. If this were the case,
we would underestimate the effect of unemployment change at application on economists’
career decision after the PhD (the “academic” variable). The reason is that many of those
who would want to switch would have already done so before we consider them in our
population of graduates. On the other hand, there might be a higher dropout rate for
the boom cohort because its individuals are of lower academic quality. In this case, our
parameters would underestimate the effect of unemployment change at application on the
performance of graduates and academics. According to the correlation Table B.7, our
estimate of the attrition rate is not significantly correlated with unemployment change at
application or graduation.
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Third, PhDs might time their graduation in order to circumvent entering the private or the
academic job market during a time of recession.11 The effect of such a graduation timing
on our parameter estimates would depend on whether the high- or the low skilled bring
their graduation date forward (or delay it). For example, if in a recession students with
low academic talent delay their end of the PhD, we overestimate the effect on productivity
at graduation, but underestimate the effect on becoming an academic. Table B.7 reports
the correlation of graduation numbers and unemployment change according to the NSF
data and the AEA doctoral listings, respectively. Reassuringly, graduation numbers seem
not to be at all related to the state of the business cycle.
Finally, a last concern might be that, contrary to our assumption in the model, the
business cycle is systematically correlated with itself in the six years between a cohort’s
application and graduation. Table B.8 reports this and the contemporaneous correla-
tion exemplary for unemployment change and GDP growth. The correlation table with
unemployment levels and recession indicators are available on request from the authors.
Unsurprisingly both measures are strongly contemporaneously related. However, there
is no significant correlation, neither of unemployment change nor GDP change, between
the time of application and graduation. If at all, there may be a very slightly reversing
relationship over the six years. This could imply that we potentially underestimate the
effect of the business cycle on academic performance because a recession cohort at grad-
uation is more likely a boom cohort at application (and thus is inherently not as able)
and vice versa for a boom cohort at graduation. For the same reason we might in this
case overestimate the effect of the business cycle on the career decision (i.e. the academic
variable) at application and at graduation.
11In Appendix B.3 we document that also academic job offers decline during recession.
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B.5 Supporting Evidence for the Selection Channel
In the theory section of the main text we hypothesize that during downturns more indi-
viduals want to enter academia and, due to a fixed number of open spaces at entry to the
PhD, only a favorable selection with superior ability is admitted. Unfortunately, however,
we see ourselves unable to provide direct evidence for the selection mechanism at work.
This is for the following reason:
In order to gather evidence, we were looking for data that provides observable ex ante
characteristics of the students admitted to the PhD programs which we could then relate
to the state of the business cycle. We obtained Graduate Record Examination (GRE)
scores for a non-US PhD program that is comparable to a tier two school. The GRE
consists of three sections: quantitative, verbal and analytical writing. In all universities,
GRE scores are considered an obligatory part of the application documents and it is
generally agreed that it is almost exclusively the quantitative section that matters for
admission. For this reason, our GRE scores proved to be uninformative. We found that,
independently of the state of the business cycle, virtually everyone accepted to the PhD
as well as most applicants had the highest possible mark (800 points) in the quantitative
section.
In general, we are very skeptical that easily observable ex ante characteristics, such as
GRE data or undergraduate GPAs, of applicants or entrants would be informative about
the selection into the programs because many successful and unsuccessful applicants do
not differ in these dimensions. The truly informative quality differences of applicants and
entrants are most likely to be more subtly hidden in “softer” information such as refer-
ence letters, research assistantships and types of courses taken during the undergraduate
degree. This kind of information is very hard to obtain and to process in an objective
way.
Although we are unable to present direct evidence for our hypothesized channel, Kelly
Bedard and Douglas Herman published a study in the Economics of Education Review
(2008) that documents supporting evidence for our main selection channel. They use
data on recently graduated science and engineering Bachelor and Master students from
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1990 to 2000 which is provided in the 1993 to 2001 National Survey of Recent College
Graduates (NSRCG). Exploiting the variation in state-level unemployment rates, Bedard
and Herman find that male PhD enrollment is counter-cyclical and the counter-cyclicality
is driven by students with a high GPA in the hard sciences.12 They state that the
unemployment rate responses for this group are fairly precisely estimated and that their
estimates imply a one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate increases “high
GPA” male Ph.D. enrollment by 0.356 percentage points.
In another paper, Fougere and Pouget (2003) find that the applications per spaces ratio
in the French public sector rises strongly in economically hard times. Unfortunately they
do not provide a quality measure of French public sector workers.
B.6 Robustness Checks
In this section we show that our results are robust when we use several different mea-
surement concepts for publication productivity. We also consider briefly the subsample
of graduates from the elite tier one institutions and productivity of academics selected
under different criteria for becoming an academic.
B.6.1 Alternative Measures for Productivity
One might be concerned that our dynamic productivity measure does not properly cap-
ture the actual achievements of an academic. We consider three alternative measures of
academic productivity in Table B.9: the number of top journal articles, the h-value and
the raw number of articles. We classify articles in the “Econometrica”, “The American
Economic Review”, “The Quarterly Journal of Economics”, “The Review of Economic
Studies”, “The Journal of Political Economy” and “The Journal of Finance” as top jour-
nal articles. The h-index (Hirsch index or Hirsch number) is a currently very popular
12They look at entry into all PhD programs in terms of quality and subject and not only the top 30
economics programs. Therefore, quantity constraints at entry to the PhD should matter much less and it
is not surprising that they not only find the expected quality differences of entrants with respect to the
business cycle, but also quantity differences. Moreover, it is also not surprising that GPAs matter (more
strongly) for engineering and science majors and for a broader range of graduate schools than just the
top 30 departments.
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measure based on citations and number of articles. An economist has index h if h of his N
papers have at least h citations each, and the other N - h papers have at most h citations
each. The last measure is the raw number of articles written as recorded in JSTOR. In
Table B.9 we report the results for these three alternative productivity measures for the
full and the academic subsample. All mean estimates for every business cycle measure
point in the same direction as the dynamic performance measure in the main text and
as the selection theory predicts. The only exceptions are the estimated coefficients for
the recession indicator for the full sample at application but in fact the theory makes
no prediction on the effect of the business cycle at application on productivity for all
PhDs. Furthermore, in many cases the coefficients are statistically significant at conven-
tional levels. Thus, our results appear largely robust to the use of different productivity
measures.
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B.6.2 The Tier 1 Subsample
In this section we consider the subsample of economists who graduated from the elite tier
1 schools and repeat all our regressions for these highly skilled individuals. According to
Table B.10, the magnitude of the effects appears to be larger in all considered dimensions.
The estimated coefficients are in some specification more, and in some specification less,
significant than in the main text. Taken together, the results for the Tier 1 graduates
support our findings in the main text.
Table B.10: Main regression results (Tier 1)
Productivity Academic Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 5.39∗∗ -1.72∗∗∗ 9.86∗∗∗
(2.12) (0.58) (2.93)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 4.35∗ 2.87∗∗∗ 3.97
(2.39) (0.94) (3.45)
Unemployment (Application) 3.19 -1.23 5.91∗
(2.03) (1.03) (3.15)
Unemployment (Graduation) 2.55 -0.08 3.73
(2.44) (0.92) (3.95)
GDP Growth (Application) -1.98∗∗ 0.75∗∗ -3.67∗∗∗
(0.89) (0.29) (1.24)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -1.25 -1.25∗∗∗ -0.84
(1.10) (0.36) (1.57)
Recession (Application) 7.51 -5.73∗∗∗ 16.88∗
(6.15) (1.73) (8.51)
Recession (Graduation) 5.40 3.95∗∗ 4.06
(6.88) (1.67) (9.91)
Subsample Tier 1 Tier 1 Tier 1 Academic
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 234 234 232
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B.6.3 Productivity of Academics Selected Under Different Cri-
teria
In the main text, we report three different measures which might indicate that an indi-
vidual is an academic: Our standard “academic” measure equals one if he is a faculty
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member or a member of the American Economic Association after graduation from the
PhD. The second measure is one if the PhD student becomes a faculty member at a
US business, economics or finance department and the third one shows if the student is
able to publish in one of our ranked journals after graduation. In the main text, due
to conciseness, we left out the robustness of our productivity regressions of academics
with regard to the last two measures. In Table B.11, we report this robustness check
for completeness. All coefficients have the same sign as when selection is according to
our standard “academic” measure with the exception of GDP Growth at graduation for
the faculty measure. However, in fact the theory makes no prediction on the effect of
the business cycle at graduation on the productivity of academics. Some coefficients are
more and some are less significant than in the main text. Overall, our results on the
productivity of academics seem quite robust with respect to how we identify academics.
Table B.11: Alternative measure for being an academic: productivity
Productivity Productivity Productivity
Unempl Change (Application) 3.27∗∗∗ 6.80∗∗∗ 5.63∗∗∗
(0.94) (2.49) (1.29)
Unempl Change (Graduation) 2.74∗∗ 2.08 4.35∗∗∗
(1.20) (1.86) (1.09)
Unemployment (Application) 2.98∗∗ 6.54∗∗ 4.10∗∗
(1.10) (2.84) (1.55)
Unemployment (Graduation) 3.08∗∗ 4.58 4.44∗∗∗
(1.26) (2.80) (1.57)
GDP Growth (Application) -1.46∗∗∗ -2.64∗∗ -2.39∗∗∗
(0.42) (1.00) (0.58)
GDP Growth (Graduation) -0.74 0.06 -1.55∗∗
(0.56) (0.91) (0.60)
Recession (Application) 5.38∗ 7.73 7.70
(2.93) (6.14) (4.68)
Recession (Graduation) 5.09 1.85 8.07∗∗
(3.57) (5.61) (3.57)
Subsample Academic Faculty Publish
University-Decade Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1047 903 974
Note.—Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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